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THE CLOSED SHOP ISSUE IN WORLD WAR II
T. T. HAMMONDt
INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 1941, less than a month before Pearl Harbor,
American defense production was threatened with chaos. Approxi-
mately 150,000 members of the United Mine Workers Union were out
on strike. Interruptions in the mining of coal during September,
October, and November had so curtailed the coal supply that defense
plants in many parts of the country were threatened with the possi-
bility of having to quit work on government orders. The National
Defense Mediation Board, whose job it was to keep defense disputes
at a minimum, had been unable to settle the miners' strike and had
fallen to pieces as a result of the struggle.
This dangerous interruption in the preparation of America for war
had been caused by a dispute over a single issue-union security. This
was the same issue which had halted construction of warships at the
Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, had caused a prolonged
strike at Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, almost broke up the
President's Industry-Labor Conference, resulted in government con-
fiscation of the S. A. Woods Machine Company, and threatened to
destroy the War Labor Board just as it had destroyed the National
Defense Mediation Board. Under both boards the issue which aroused
most public controversy and which gave government mediators the
most headaches was the question of whether or not unions should be
given security by granting them the all-union shop'* or some modifi-
cation thereof.
The fight over the all-union shop during World War II was merely
a continuation and intensification of a struggle which has been going
on between employers and labor unions since the beginnings of modern
industrial enterprise. The labor offensive for the all-union shop dur-
ing the thirties and forties had its counterparts in the organized drives
for the open shop2* which have been waged by employer associations
ever since the beginning of the first such drive in 1903.
t Graduate student during the past year at the University of North Carolina.
The present article is a condensation of a thesis prepared for the Master's degree
in Economics. Mr. Hammond has worked under the direction of Dr. Harry D.
Wolf, Professor of Labor Law, and Judge J. Warren Madden, former Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Board.
'. All-union shop is a term used to embrace both the closed shop and the union
shop. A closed shop requires that only union members be hired. A union shop
requires that all who are hired become union members.
2* An open shop is theoretically a shop in which both union and non-union
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The all-union shop controversy has always been a bitter one because
it is logically the final battlefront in the continual war in American
industrial relations as to how much voice labor shall have in determin-
ing conditions of employment. Although the all-union shop is usually
attacked or defended on the basis of idealistic and theoretical principles,
the controversy is fundamentally a struggle for power between the
unions and the employers-a question of whether or not labor unions
shall be big and strong.
Before the passage of the National Labor Relations Act the oppo-
sition of employers to the all-union shop was merely one phase of their
effort to drive out unions altogether. Naturally enough, employers have
resisted any movement .designed to reduce their freedom in managing
their businesses as they pleased. Now that their chief methods of
opposition to unions are prohibited by law, employers have pretty gen-
erally accepted the fact that they must bargain collectively with the
representatives of their employees. Having been forced to recognize
and bargain with the unions, many employers are now taking a last
ditch stand against any further strengthening of labor's hand through
an extension of the all-union shop.
As long ago as 1905, Samuel Gompers expressed the opinion that:
"It is absurd to consent to, or give assent to the organization of labor,
and deny the logical result-the union shop.' 3  It is fairly safe to say
today as then that the ultimate goal for which all unions are striving
and hoping is the all-union shop. Unions may find themselves forced
for the time being to be satisfied with less, but they are always eager
to obtain the all-union shop as a means of making themselves secure
from employer opposition and other disintegrating forces.
The all-union shop device is essentially the same as the principle
practiced by the medieval guilds of requiring a worker to join the guild
in order to follow the trade under its jurisdiction.4 It was practiced
in this country even before the American Revolution 5 'and since that
time has been gradually extended by the unions wherever they desired
it and were strong enough to secure it.
Despite the organized opposition of employers, the all-union shop
has spread until by 1942 approximately 4,000,000 Americans were
working under closed shop or union shop contracts, in addition to
many others, like the railroad brotherhoods and the Pacific Coast long-
employees can work, free from any kind of discrimination by management because
of membership or non-membership. In practice, however, employers have frequently
used the term "open shop" for shops which refused to hire any union men or
showed preference to non-union men.
!I J. L. TONER, THE CLOSED SHoP (Washington: American Council on Public
Affairs, 1942) 6.
" Id. at 7. 5Id. at 6.
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shoremen, who worked under virtual union shop conditions. 6 This
means that about forty per cent of the workers under union contracts,
or about twelve per cent of all the workers in America, were by 1942
working under all-union shop conditions.7
WHY UNIONS WANT THE ALL-UNION SHOP
The chief reason why unions are so anxious to obtain the all-union
shop is for their protection-protection against the opposition of em-
ployers and against non-union workers. Very few employers have
ever willingly accepted collective bargaining, but have done so only
because they were forced to it either through economic pressure applied
by the unions or by the enforcement of the National Labor Relations
Act. Employers have used every possible device to keep unions from
organizing their plants-labor spies, strike-breakers, blacklists, yellow
dog contracts, discrimination against union members, strike injunc-
tions, "citizens committees," anti-union propaganda, etc.8 In the face
of such opposition, unions have known that in order to exist they must
be strong and vigilant, and one of the best methods they have found of
protecting themselves has been to establish an all-union shop in which
there is no chance for the employer to show preference to non-union
workers in hiring, firing, and promotion. When all workers are re-
quired to join the union and abide by the terms of the contract, there
is no danger of ignorant or substandard workers being hired at less
pay and thereby undermining the good working conditions which the
union has striven to establish. The bargaining position of the union
is immeasurably improved if its representatives can sit down to the
bargaining table with the unanimous backing of all the workers behind
them. Thus a union with an all-union shop contract stands a much
better chance of securing demands for higher wages and other improve-
ments in working conditions.
It is true that the National Labor Relations Act has established the
right of employees to collective bargaining and has made illegal many
of the devices formerly used by employers in their fight against unions,
so that today the all-union shop is much less essential to the security of
the unions than it was in the past. There are still many undercover
ways, however, by which anti-union employers are continuing their
opposition to the organization of their employees.
Whether or not a union trys to obtain an all-union shop depends
' Florence Peterson, Extent of Collective Bargaining at Beginning of 1942
(May, 1942) 54 MONTuLY LAD. Ra'v. 1069 (Washington: United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Id. at 1066.
' Open Shop Keepers (Jan. 29, 1942) 5 LAB. REL. REP. 619 (Washington:
Bureau of National Affairs).
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to a large extent upon what it knows the employer's attitude to be, and
in several cases they have not insisted upon it when they knew they
had nothing to fear. In England, for example, where trade unions are
generally accepted, the unions have never felt the necessity for demand-
ing a written all-union shop agreement.9
Several factors have made the unions especially desirous of making
themselves secure during wartime. No matter how strong it may have
been in the past, the position of a union is imperiled when hordes of
new workers are coming into the plant, when production in non-defense
industries is decreased or ceases altogether, when plants close their
doors for a period of months while converting to war production, 'or
when all sorts of other changes occur as a result of war.
It must be added that while the insistence of unions for the all-union
shop depends upon their need for security, it is also influenced strongly
by whether or not the unions think that sucl a demand could be ob-
tained. Thus a new, struggling union may be in great need of a security
clause and not be able to obtain it, while a large, strongly entrenched
union may secure a complete closed shop merely because it can exert
enough economic pressure upon the employer.
WHY EMPLOYERS OPPOSE THE ALL-UNION SHOP
For the most part, the opposition of employers to the all-union
shop is just one phase of their opposition to unions in general. Thus
in the past the 'drives made by employer associations against the all-
union shop really had as an underlying purpose the elimination of unions
altogether.10 Today unions are too strong and too well protected by
law for employers to have much hope of ever getting rid of them com-
pletely. Since unions are here to stay, employers are now fighting the
all-union shop as one way of preventing the unions from becoming any
more powerful.
Employers know that a strong union with an all-union shop con-
tract will be in a better position to insist upon other concessions, in-
cluding demands for higher wages, shorter hours, and better shop con-
ditions-all of which appear to the employer as a reduction of his profits.
Naturally enough the employer prefers to have a completely free hand
in the management of his business. Thus he opposes anything which
restricts his power to hire and fire whom he pleases and for whatever
reason. He feels that the absolute power to compel obedience is essential
'JOSEPH ROSENFARB, THE NATIOAL LA3OR POLICY AND How IT WORXS
(1940) 248; TONER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 21.
"oSELIG PERLMAN AND PHILIP TAFr, "Labor Movements," 4 HISTORY OF
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 (1935) 491.
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to productive efficiency, and fears that unions are attempting to take over
some of the functions which rightfully belong only to management.1 1
This is not to say that employers never oppose the all-union shop
for altruistic reasons or on a basis of principle. Many companies have
voluntarily, without any direct pressure from unions, given their em-
ployees excellent working conditions. Such employers are apt to feel
that things have gone well for their workers without the help of a
union, and look upon the union as merely a trouble maker and an addi-
tional expense to the employees.
Nor is it true that all employers without exception oppose the all-
union shop. There have been instances, as in the clothing industry,
where it has been welcomed because it stabilized labor standards and
reduced cutthroat competition. 12 At other times employers have
claimed that an all-union shop cooperation between management
and the unions has increased production and promoted efficiency.' 3
Then there is the famous case of Henry Ford, who, when he finally
saw that he was going to have to deal with the union, surprised every-
one by granting a full union shop because it was easier to deal with
all of his employees on the same basis.
IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The economic conditions in an industry largely determine the kind
of union security which is demanded. In skilled trades such as in pat-
tern making or the building trades, the possession of a union card is
evidence that the owner has passed through a period of apprenticeship
long erough to train him for quality work. Thus in skilled trades it is
customary to demand the full closed shop form requiring that a worker
already be a member of the union to be hired. In large industries
where a majority of the jobs require little or no training, it is customary
to use the union shop form, which permits the employer to hire any
workers who are available, but requires them to join the union after
they have started to work.
Varying economic conditions in different industries also determine
whether or not unions feel that the all-union shop is necessary. Where
the employer faces extreme competition from other manufacturers he
is always tempted to cut wages and lengthen hours so as to avoid being
undersold. In the manufacture of clothing, for example, the unions
have tried to establish all-union shop conditions throughout the industry
so that wages and working conditions could be standardized.'
4
11 Reuben Robertson, Against the Closed Shop, New York Times Magazine,
Aug. 2, 1942, p. 7. Mr. Robertson is chairman of the Committee on Industrial
Relations of the National Association of Manufacturers.
'2 TONER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 85. 3 Id. at 81.
"IDAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (5th ed. 1941) 461.
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Highly skilled workers are less afraid of losing their jobs than
unskilled workers who know the employer could replace them without
any trouble. Hence, in some occupations which require a long period
of training, the demand for the all-union shop is less insistent. This
is one of the reasons why the railroad brotherhoods have not demanded
it.'
5
In industries where wages constitute a large proportion of total
cost, employers are especially anxious to keep the workers from organ-
izing so as to demand raises. This is the situation where a large pro-
portion of the manufacturing is done through sub-contracting. On the
other hand, where the employer has made a large investment in factory
buildings and equipment the importance of wage costs decreases, and
the union can more easily maintain working standards."0
There are many other economic factors in particular industries
which influence demands for the all-union shop. The railroad brother-
hoods are often pointed to by opponents of the all-union shop as model
unions which have made themselves strong without relying on the all-
union shop. Special conditions are responsible, however.' 7 The work-
ers have not had to fear wage cutting competition between different
employers, because working conditions are standardized.' 8 The unions
have had little trouble in soliciting membership because the dangerous
nature of the occupations makes workers anxious to take advantage of
the union accident insurance programs.19 The union members know
they need have no fears of competition from unskilled workers. 20 Thus,
on the railroads, virtual closed shop conditions exist without the neces-
sity of written contracts to that effect.
The fact that a firm has a monopoly or near-monopoly in its industry
has had varying effects on union status. In some cases the company
has been willing to grant an all-union shop because it has been able to
grant high wages without any strain. In other instances large cor-
porate monopolies have used their great power as a means of hindering
or preventing any unionization at all.2 '
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF UNION SECURITY
There are almost as many different forms of union security as there
are union contracts. Most of them, however, fall within the following
general types :22
" ToNFR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 107.
" DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 462.
" See TONER, op. cit. sapra note 3, Chap. IV, "Conditions in the Railroad
Industry" 93-114.
18 Id. at 98. ":Id. at 107, 108.
20Id. at 107. 2 DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 462.
22 For further discussions of the various forms of union security, see: Louis
L. JAFFE AND WILLIAm GRAHAM RICE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL DrENsE
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1. Closed Shop. All persons employed must be union members
when hired and must remain union members during employment.
2. Union Shop. All persons employed must within a specified
time after hiring become and remain union members.
3. Preferential Shop. Union members are given preference in
hiring, in firing, in distribution of work, or in promotion. Preferential
hiring is the usual form.
4. Maintenance of Membership. All employees who on a certain
date are union members or thereafter become union members must
maintain membership as a condition of employment.
5. Check-Off. The employer must periodically deduct a certain
amount of an employee's pay and give to the union the amount deducted
as dues or other obligations to the union. The check-off may not re-
quire the consent of the member or it may require specific authoriza-
tion; in the latter case it may or may not permit revocation of the
authorization.
6. Employer Encouragement of the Union. These clauses are of
great variety. Sometimes the employer recommends that all employees
join the union and maintain their membership. In others the employer
may merely state that he approves of the union and will cooperate
with it.
7. Discipline of Anti-Union Activity. These clauses require the
employer to discipline by discharge, lay-off, or otherwise, employees
whose activity imperils the position of the contracting union.
It is not to be inferred that the above words always mean the same
whenever and wherever they are used. On the contrary, a great deal
of confusion is created by the various ways in which the terms "closed
shop" and "union shop" are used. Unions almost always use the term
"union shop" to include both of these forms, so as to avoid the unfavor-
able connotations of the word "closed."
2 3
Employers, on the other hand, persist in using the term "closed shop"
because they know that to the man in the street it sounds despotic and
undemocratic in contrast with the "open shop." 24 For example, during
the President's Industry-Labor Conference preceding the creation of
the National War Labor Board, the employer members defined the
closed shop as follows: "The term closed shop includes any provision
which requires a person to become or remain a member of a labor
organization in order to get or hold a job or have preference in respect
MEDIATION BOARD (unpublished report done at the request of National Defense
Mediation Board, Washington, 1942) Part II, pp. 9-10; Union Security: Three
Definitions (May 11, 1942) 10 LAD. REL. REP. 352; and DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 458-460.
ToNER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10.
*' DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 458.
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to employment." 25 To help avoid confusion in the meaning of these
terms many people use "all-union shop" to include both the closed shop.
and union shop.
Maintenance of membership clauses have also been criticized by
employers as being just a camouflaged form of the closed shop.20 There
are very important differences, however, as was pointed out by the
National War Labor Board in the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock
case:27
"The maintenance of membership clause does not require any worker,
at any time, to join the Union. It does not require the Company to
employ only members of the Union and is, therefore, not a closed shop.
It does not require the employees who have been hired by the Company
to join the Union, and is, therefore, not a union shop. It does not re-
quire the Company to give preference in hiring to members of the
.Union, and is, therefore, not a preferential union shop. It does not
require any old employee, any new employee, or any employee whatever
to join the Union at any time."
'28
Maintenance of membership clauses were very infrequent until the
time of the war, because a union which was in a position to demand a
security clause naturally tried to obtain one of the stronger kinds. Dur-
ing the war, however, it has overshadowed in significance all other
types of union security -due to its wide use by the National Defense
Mediation Board and the National War Labor Board as a substitute
for the all-union shop.
HOW ANALL-UNION SHOP OPERATES
In the United States, all-union shop conditions seldom exist without
the presence of a written contract to that effect, although the reverse
is true in Europe.29  These all-union contracts have three essential
characteristics: a statement of the jurisdiction of the contract, provision
for discharge of non-unionists, and procedure for hiring of new
employees.
The contract may include within its jurisdiction all workers in the
plant, or it may be limited to only those in a certain department or those
in a certain occupation. In large industrial concerns employing un-
skilled workers an all-union shop contract is most likely to cover all of
the employees in the plant and be of the union shop form, which allows
23 Union Security: Three Definitions (May 11, 1942) 10 LAD. REI. REP. 352,
"Robertson, supra note 11, at 7.
-7 Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. and Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 46 (June 30, 1941). This case was taken over by the War Labor Board
when the Mediation Board ceased to function.
"National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, April 25, 1942.
"TONER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22.
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the employer to hire any workers he chooses so long as they join the
union. It sometimes happens, however, that one employer will have
several closed shop contracts, each applying to a certain occupation,
while other groups in the same plant will remain unorganized and cov-
ered by no contract at all.30 Sometimes the contract requires that the
worker must be a member of a particular local, while in other cases
any member of the national or international union can be employed.31
Discharge of non-unionists is always implied under an all-union
shop although there may be no specific provision for it in the contract.
Under a union shop a certain time limit is usually fixed during which
new employees must join the union if they are to continue to hold their
jobs.8 2 Should a member be expelled from the union, the employer is
notified of that fact by the union and must discharge the employee im-
mediately or after a few days' notice. In some cases the union is left
free to expel members or reject applicants as it sees fit, while in others
such action is subject to the review of the employer or of an arbitration
board. Some contracts contain promises by the union that it will not
change its membership requirements nor expel members without a fair
hearing.33 Failure to pay dues for a certain period of time is sometimes
made cause for automatic discharge. A check-off of union dues is useful
in preventing the necessity of dismissing employees on this account.
Hiring procedures show the greatest amount of variance. Under a
closed shop the employer usually agrees to hire new employees through
the office of the local union. The choice of who shall be sent to fill the
jobs may be left up to the union, or the employer may be permitted to
choose which workers he wants from a list of those who are available.
In rare cases the employer is permitted to pick anyone who has a mem-
bership card in the union, whether or not a member of the particular
local. If the union is unable to supply members to fill the jobs within
a certain number of hours the employer is free to hire non-union work-
ers within certain limits. Such non-union men may be allowed to keep
the jobs permanently or they may be permitted to work on a temporary
basis. If it is understood that they are hired on a permanent basis, they
are usually required to join the union. Otherwise, they will be replaced
as soon as union members can be found to fill the jobs. In the building
trades, where the unions often try to limit their membership, temporary
non-union workers usually are not given membership, but are required
to obtain working permits from the local.
84
Under a union shop contract, of course, the employer is usually
left entirely free to employ any workers he chooses, so long as they
30Id. at 28-29. "1 Id. at 33.32Id. at 36. 3 3 Id. at 38.
1' Id. at 38-42; Closed Shop and Check-Off in Union; Agreements (October,
1939) 49 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 830, 832.
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join the union within a certain period of time after starting to work.
Preferential hiring contracts follow the same general hiring procedures
as are practiced under a closed shop, except that employees are not
required to join the union or remain in the union to keep their jobs.
Methods of enforcing an all-union shop vary from industry to in-
dustry. Probably the most efficient method of enforcement is through
the use of a check-off applied to all employees. Where the employer
regularly deducts from the wages of each worker the amount owed to
the union as dues and assessments, the union is thereby guaranteed
that all of the employees will remain members in good standing at least
from a financial standpoint. Shop stewards and union business agents
are usually charged with the responsibility of seeing that the all-union
shop provisions are enforced. Sometimes their job is facilitated by the
use of membership cards or union buttons as a means of identifying
members of the union.8 5
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ALL-UNION SHOP
Numerous arguments against the all-union shop can be found in
magazines and newspapers, and in the numerous pamphlets distributed
by the National Association of. Manufacturers and other employer
associations. The usual arguments can be summarized as follows: (The
term "closed shop" is always used in these arguments.)
1. The closed shop is a denial of one of the fundamental rights of
man, the right to work. It forces a worker to join a private organiza-
tion against his will in order to exercise his individual right to earn a
living.
2. The closed shop is undemocratic because it does not protect
minority rights. It is one thing for the minority to abide by the will
of the majority in an organization to which they both voluntarily be-
long, but it is quite another thing for the majority to compel the minority
to become a part of it.3'
3. The closed shop represses initiative, eliminates the incentive to
excel, and tends to force all workers into a mold of mediocrity. Fur-
ther extension of the closed- shop will result in an America of fixed
classes by making it impossible for the ambitious workers to forge
ahead s 7
4. The dosed shop hinders productive efficiency. The primary
concern of union leaders is not to increase production but rather to
" William M. Leiserson, Closed Shop and Open Shop (1935) 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 569.
"Ernest T. Weir, Against the Closed Shop, New York Times Magazine, Aug.
2, 1942, p. 7. Mr. Weir is chairman of the National Steel Corporation.
"' John Chamberlain, Democracy and the Closed Shop (Jan., 1942) 25 FORTUNE
64,65.
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keep the greatest number of dues-paying members employed at the
highest possible wages. To do this they have resorted to "spread the
work" and other restrictive measures. Thus, costs are increased and
the consumer is made to suffer. 8
5. The dosed shop prevents efficient selection of workers. Workers
are hired and promoted not according to their ability but according to
their loyalty to union policies and their blind adherence to the dictates
of union officers.
6. The closed shop makes efficient management impossible. It gives
union leaders veto powers over management, although the union has no
responsibility for the success of the business.
7. The closed shop is used to enforce a monopoly. of the labor sup-
ply. Membership in the unions is restricted by unreasonable initiation
fees or by arbitrary refusal to take in new members. Thus a small
group of union members profit while the rest are unable to find jobs.
8. The closed shop vests dictatorial powers in union leaders. The
union member is denied the right to protest against union policies by
resigning. The closed shop is closed against effective protests from
the very membership which supports it. Union officers who are made
invulnerable by a closed shop forget the needs of the members while
feathering their own nests.3 9
9. The closed shop places in the hands of the union powers of
compulsion which rightly belong only to the state. It is no more just
to require all workers to join the union and pay dues than it is to re-
quire every beneficiary of Christian civilization to join the church and
pay the tithe.40
10. If unions have done as much to improve the condition of the
worker as they claim, then it is surprising that all workers do not
voluntarily flock into the union fold. Unions should be willing to win
membership through proving their worth to the individual instead of
depending upon the compulsion of the closed shop.4'
11. Unions no longer have any need for security against employer
opposition because they are amply protected by the National Labor
Relations Act. Unions are made even more invulnerable by a very
pro-labor administration and by a judiciary which has exempted labor
unions from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
12. Unions in England and Scandinavia and the railroad brother-
hoods in America have gained large membership through proving their
's Weir, supra note 36, at 23.
"Chamberlain, supra note 37, at 132.MTE CLOSED Snop (New York: National Association of Manufacturers,
1942) 11-12.
11 NOEL SARGENT, WOULD THE CLOSED SnoP TEND TO IMPROVE INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS? (New York: National Association of Manufacturers, 1942) 19.
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worth and responsibility, and .without resorting to the compulsion of
the closed shop. Other unions should follow their example.
13. To require an employer to hire only union members -or show
them preference is to ask him to violate the spirit of the National
Labor Relations Act, which was designed to prohibit discrimination
of any kind between workers.
14. In wartime the closed shop is especially repugnant because it
denies a citizen the privilege of working to help win the war. Further-
more, it requires employers to discharge competent workmen, thereby
reducing productive output and making the labor shortage more acute.
42
15. The closed shop issue, being of a controversial nature and one
on which the whole nation is divided, should not be decided during
wartime by an agency like the National Defense Mediation Board or
the National War Labor Board, but should be left to Congress for
enunciation of a policy.
16. The President has said that the government will not order a
closed shop. If it is wrong for the government to compel a worker to
join a union, then it is likewise wrong for an employer to do So.41
17. The government should freeze union status for the duration
as was done in the first World War. Consideration of union security
cases by the War Labor Board causes numerous disputes and inter-
ruptions in war production by unions who aim to profit from the
emergency at the expense of the rest of the country.
44
18. The presence of the closed shop after the war will prevent
returning soldiers and sailors from obtaining employment. It will
aggrevate post-war economic conditions by making it difficult to start
new industries, to reach new markets, to sell at fair prices, and to
compete in world markets.45
19. The closed shop is often unpopular with the union members
themselves. Union leaders in many cases have demanded that an
employer sign a closed shop contract when the rank and file knew noth-
ing about it and had not authorized the leaders to sign such a contract.
Even when the leaders have been able to persuade their members to
favor a dosed shop or maintenance of membership contract, the members
soon tire of being compelled to retain -their membership and would like
to resign if they could do so without losing their jobs.
20. If the War Labor Board is going to continue the policy of
granting maintenance of membership whenever union security is de-
manded, then it should require that the unions so benefited first meet
certain standards. These standards should include: democratic con-
"Id. at 12-15. "3 Id. at 7.
"William M. Leiserson, Diagnosis of War Labor Policy (Feb. 23, 1942) 9
LAB. REL. REP. 727.
" SARGENT, op. cit. supra note 41, at 18.
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stitution and by-laws, sound financing methods, periodic financial re-
ports to the members, and open membership.
21. Union leaders are free to manipulate vast sums of money col-
lected from unwilling as well as willing workers with no legal require-
ment to account for receipts and expenditures. Dangerous political
influence is wielded through their power to make campaign contributions
as they please, without the consent of the membership.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE ALL-UNION SHOP
The unions have been just as adept in devising arguments to tiefend
their sacred institution, and they have freely stated these defenses in
articles, speeches and pamphlets. (In these arguments the term "union
shop" is always used.)
1. The right to work is not absolute, but has often been seriously
qualified by society in the interest of the public good, as in the case
of the Wages and Hours Act. When a worker refuses to join the
union he is undermining working standards and thus is asserting not
the right to work but the right to starve. Without unionization, Amer-
ican citizens would have the "sacred right to work" only under the
poor conditions dictated by employers. 46
2. The union shop does not deny competent workers a job. Unions
welcome new members, insisting only that those who share in the
benefits of improved labor standards secured by the unions also share
in the unions' responsibilities.
47
3. The union shop is a phase of industrial democracy and operates
by the cardinal principle of democracy-majority rule. Refusal to
grant a union shop on the pretense that such a step would be "unfair"
to the non-union minority is in fact completely unfair to the majority
in the plant.
48
4. The union shop aids productive efficiency by stabilizing labor
relations, eliminating the strife between union and non-union workers,
and by promoting cooperation with management. Employees work
more willingly when they know the employer is thinking of their best
interests instead of trying to oppress them. Union leaders can co-
operate more fully with management and maintain shop discipline when
they do not have to worry about soliciting membership and defending
themselves against anti-union activities by the managemeiit. Thus
labor and management are made partners instead of opponents.
5. All employees in a plant profit from the higher wages and other
improved conditions which are gained by the union; therefore, it is
"William Green, For the Closed Shop, New York Times Magazine, Aug. 2,
1942, p. 6. 'T Ibid.
"'Walter P. Reuther, For the Closed Shop, New York Times Magazine, Aug.
2, 1942, p. 6.
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unjust for some to reap the benefits without paying their share of the
cost. It is no more unjust to require all employees to pay dues than
it is to require all citizens to pay taxes for the support of schools, high-
ways, and other improvements in the living standards.
6. The abuses charged to the union shop are neither inherent nor
typical. It is unjust to deny this security to all unions just because a
much publicized few have fallen into the hands of racketeers or have
restricted their membership.
7. Contrary to the pictures painted by the opponents of the union
shop, the worker is not faced with a choice between tyranny or the
blissful freedom of the open shop. Rather it is a choice between the
tyranny of the employer over whom the worker has no control what-
soever, as against membership in a democratic organization in which he
has the same "vote and the same freedom of speech as any other member.
8. The man who refuses to join his fellow workers in their fight
for better working conditions thereby sets up his desire for individual
advancement as of more influence in determining his course of action
than the welfare of his kind. He permits himself to be used by em-
ployers as a club to strike down the aspirations of the working man.49
9. Despite the existence of the National Labor Relations Act, the
majority of employers are still striving to destroy unionism and have
merely changed to more subtle, underground methods. The open shop
drive is a fight to preserve for employers the arbitrary power of dic-
tating wages and hours and to keep the workers as servile as slaves.
10. In England the union shop is so much an established custom
that employers never think of hiring non-members. Hence, the union
shop exists without the necessity of a written contract to that effect.
The same is true on the railroads in America.
11. A union obtaining a union shop contract should first be chosen
through a majority election, have a democratic constitution and admin-
istration, and make periodic reports of its finances to its members.
These prerequisites should not be required by law, however, any more
than they should be al3plied to private institutions like clubs and
churches.
12. Many employers will attest to the fact that the union shop has
helped their business through increasing production, improving the
quality of workmanship, and stabilizing industrial relations. The union
shop on an industry-wide basis standardizes conditions and reduces cut-
throat competition between employers.
,o FRANK K. FosT , HAs THE NoN-UNIONIST A MoRAL RIGHT TO WORK
How, WHEN, AND WHERE HE PLEAsEs? (Washington: The American Federation
of Labor, 1926) 5.
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13. During the last war labor took management at its word with-
out the benefit of union security clauses. When the Armistice was
signed, management returned to its private war against organized labor.
Labor knows that any weakening of its position now will merely pave
the way for new employer offensives when peace returns. 0
14. There is no basis for the charge that labor is "taking advantage
of the war." If union security clauses were eliminated for the dura-
tion, employers would be taking advantage of the war by denying
unions the fulfillment of their legitimate aspirations.
15. The existence of the war is even more reason for the use of
the union shop. It gives leaders time for the consideration of produc-
tion problems. The records of the War Production Board show numer-
ous valuable suggestions made by union leaders for aiding the war
effort.
51
16. Congress has recognized the worth of the union shop by in-
cluding in the National Labor Relations Act a specific provision main-
taining its legality.
17. It is absurd to argue that unions should be prohibited from
making campaign contributions. Employers and employer associations
as well as many other types of private organizations can and do spend
enormous amounts of money to help get their men elected and in push-
ing certain legislation through Congress. There is no reason why
labor organizations should be prevented from protecting the interests
of the millions of American working men who have until recently been
largely neglected by the government.
18. The War Labor Board was created solely for the settling of
labor disputes and has no authority to meddle in the internal affairs of
unions by dictating how they should be governed. Such action would
be just as absurd as for the War Labor Board to investigate and reg-
ulate the internal operations of the corporations involved in its labor
disputes.
So much for the general aspects of the all-union shop issue today.
There follows an analysis of the significant role which the fight over
union security has played in the proceedings of the National Defense
Mediation Board and the National War Labor Board, and also an
attempt to evaluate the pros and cons of the all-union shop, give an
estimate of the work of the two labor boards, and make some estimate
as to the future of the all-union shop after the war.
"0 Reuther, supra note 48, at 23. "1 Ibid.
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UNION SECURITY UNDER THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
MEDIATION BOARD
THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE BOARD
The outbreak of World War II in the autumn of 1939 brought about
considerable changes in the condition of American labor unions. Ever
increasing demands for war materials for the purpose of arming the
United States and friendly nations abroad meant increased employment
in industries manufacturing such goods. Increased employment nat-
urally meant increased union membership, and the greater demand for
labor meant improvement in the bargaining power of labor.
For many reasons the wartime industrial boom was sure to bring
with it a large number of industrial disputes, just as it had in World
War I. Adjustments had to be made in regard to the longer hours
which defense production necessitated, in regard to the higher wages
needed to meet increases in the cost of living, and in regard to the
union membership of the hordes of newly employed workers.
There were several 'differences in the status of American labor
unions in 1939 as compared with 1914, differences which indicated that
the issue of union security would play a much more significant role in
the labor relations of World War II than it had in World War I.
Organized labor entered the defense period with a large and militant
membership. While during the first war many unions had to fight
desperately for mere recognition, by 1939 the right of collective bar-
gaining had been guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act and
was generally accepted by employers.
Union Security. The right to union recognition having been won,
labor was now eager to secure from employers further security in the
form of closed shop and union shop agreements. In many cases unions
strengthened by the war boom reached the point where they knew
they were powerful enough to enforce a demand for the all-union shop
if they resorted to their most powerful weapon-the strike. Moreover,
conditions often made it appear to the union that some form of all-union
shop was necessary for its security. The AFL-CIO rivalry operated in
many plants to keep the "in-union" perpetually afraid that it would be
supplanted by the rival union which was trying to win over its mem-
bers. Organizing problems were presented by the great numbers of
new employees coming to fill the jobs created by the boom. It was
only natural that union leaders who were being asked to devote their
energies toward makimizing production should ask in return that they
be given some help in keeping the workers in the plant loyal to the
union. Unions have traditionally won members into their ranks by
their ability to win for workers better conditions-higher pay, shorter
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hours, etc.-and the main force behind union demands has been the
ability to strike. Thus, when the right to strike was generally sacrificed
so as not to interrupt war production, and later when the government's
anti-inflation policy discouraged general wage increases, unions felt it
essential that they be granted some guarantee that they would not lose
in membership as a result of the war. "Union security" in the form
of an agreement providing a closed shop or one of its modifications
became the battle cry in a large proportion of the wartime labor dis-
putes which were to perplex the Conciliation Service, then the National
Defense Mediation Board, and later the National War Labor Board.
Machinery for Settlement of Disputes: Conciliation Service. When
the European war broke out there were already in existence in America
several mechanisms for settling labor disputes. First of all, there was
the National Labor Relations Board, which designated employee rep-
resentatives, enforced the right of collective bargaining, and prohibited
certain "unfair labor practices" by employers. There was the National
Mediation Board (not to be confused with the later National Defense
Mediation Board) in the railroad industry, and the Maritime Labor
Board in the shipping industry. There were seven "little Wagner acts"
in seven states, and mediation agencies in a majority of the states.52
Most important of all, there was the Conciliation Service of the
Department of Labor, with experienced conciliators who could be sent
to any part of the country when a dispute arose. It was these already
functioning government agencies, and chiefly the Conciliation Service,
which were given the job of settling all defense disputes up until the
time of the creation of the National Defense Mediation Board.
At the beginning of the war, and for several months thereafter, only
a small minority of the industries of the country were engaged in
production of war goods, and little was heard of the "defense" disputes,
which were handled in routine manner by the Conciliation Service. It
was not until well into 1940 that the nation became conscious that
uninterrupted production in industries making war materials was essen-
tial to the security of the nation, and hence that strikes in those in-
dustries had to be kept at a minimum. In June, 1940, Secretary
Perkins indicated that the Department of Labor was becoming con-
cerned about defense strikes when she assigned seven experienced com-
missioners of the Conciliation Service to specialize in 'defense disputes. 3
In a press conference on May 21, 1940, President Roosevelt said he
believed that labor on defense projects did not want to take advantage
of the situation by striking for special privileges not enjoyed by others
in the labor movement.54
115 L. REIL REP. 146 (Oct. 16, 1939).
"6 LAB. RE . REP. 545 (June 17, 1940).
"6 LAB. REL. REP. 441 (May 27, 1940).
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In the latter half of 1940, as more and more plants became engaged
in some form of war production, the Conciliation Service found it in-
creasingly necessary to devote its attention to preventing interruption
of the armament program. Steps taken by the Conciliation Service
during this period in order to improve its efficiency included the hiring
of a total of twelve additional conciliators, reorganization of adminis-
trative procedure on a regional basis, and arrangements for cooperation
with the National Defense Advisory Commission."
The function of the Conciliation Service was, as the name implies,
limited chiefly to conciliation, or to use a synonymous term, mediation.
It had no power to decide disputes, to issue recommendations, to make
orders, to compel the parties to resort to arbitration, or to force workers
not to strike. Lacking the authority to order cessation of strikes, the
Conciliation Service tried to keep an ear to the ground for possible
trouble spots and settle the dispute before it reached the point of a
strike or lockout. Immediately upon receiving notice of a defense dis-
pute, a conciliator was sent to the scene. If a strike was in progress
or scheduled for the near future, he first attempted to have the strike
postponed while negotiations continued. The conciliator would then sit
in on conferences between representatives of the employer and the em-
ployees, making suggestions and trying to effect a compromise . 0
Where conciliation failed to prevent or end a strike, the Service
itself had no further possible line of action. In such cases other gov-
ernment agencies and high government officials sometimes exerted
pressure.
Because of the very nature of conciliation, the Conciliation Service
had no policies regarding the all-union shop or any other issues. It
attempted settlement not on the basis of any set of principles, but on
any terms to which the parties would agree. Thus whether conciliation
resulted in the all-union shop or whether such a demand was refused,
depended upon the attitudes of the conflicting parties and not on the
policy of the government. If a conciliator thought that an all-union
shop would settle the dispute, he would suggest it, and vice versa. But
he had no power to enforce the suggestion. Whatever settlement was
made of the union security issue was made by agreement between the
two parties involved. Thus it is impossible to show any set of general
principles by which union security disputes were settled under the
Conciliation Service.
In the early part of 1941, satisfaction with the efficiency of the Con-
ciliation Service in handling defense disputes was expressed by such
various sources as Sidney Hillman,5 7 the United States Chamber of
"17 LAB. REL. REP. 228-229 (Nov. 4, 1940).
"Ibid. 577 LAB. REL. RE. 601 (Feb. 10, 1941).
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Commerce, 58 and the CIO.59 President Roosevelt eilled attention to
the fact that only a small number of strikes were occurring. 60 Public
opinion, however, was becoming alarmed that there were any defense
strikes at all, and Congress hastened consideration of anti-strike bills.61
Several things happened in February and early March which made
it appear that something in addition to the Conciliation Service was
needed to curb strikes. There was a sharp increase in the number of
man days lost during February as compared to January and as com-
pared to the previous year.62 Additional strikes threatened in such
large concerns as Ford Motor Company and Bethlehem Steel, which
had defense contracts totaling more than $1,500,000,000.3 On March
11, the President signed the Lend-Lease Bill, which made it even more
essential that war production continue uninterrupted. The combination
of these factors made it imperative that something further be done about
the strike situation.
Talk began about the establishment of a board similar to the War
Labor Board of 1918. Undersecretary of War Patterson appeared
before the House Judiciary Committee with a list of strikes which were
interfering seriously with production for the Army, and advocated that
a super mediation agency be formed.6 4 The labor committee of the
Twentieth Century Fund recommended the creation of a Federal
Emergency Mediation Board to supplement the agencies already in
operation.65 On March 13, Secretary Perkins met with the two heads
of the Office of Production Management, Sidney Hillman and William
Knudsen, to discuss the proposal, and then the three of them conferred
with President Roosevelt. 66 William Green of the AFL and Philip
Murray of the CIO were consulted. Finally, on March 19, the Presi-
dent by executive order created the National Defense Mediatioti Board.
67
HOW THE DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD OPERATED
The establishment of the Defense Mediation Board marked no rad-
ical change in the policy of the government toward defense strikes,
however. Persuasion rather than compulsion was still the chief method
of preventing stoppages, and the Conciliation Service still handled all
except the most important cases. In the executive order creating the
Defense Mediation Board the President ordered employers and em-
ployees to give the Conciliation Servicd "(a) notice . . . of any desired
"7 id. at 576 (Feb. 3, 1941). 8 id. at 31 (March 10, 1941).00N. Y. Times, March 8, 1941, p. 8.
61 See 7 LAB. REL. Rdt. 577, 589 (Feb. 3, 1941) ; 8 id. at 1, 5, 6 (March 3,
1941).
828 LAB. REL. REP. 183 (April 7, 1941).
8 Id. at 1 (March 3, 1941). "Id. at 25 (March 10, 1941).
8 Id. at 30. "Id. at 57 (March 17, 1941).
', Executive Order No. 8716 (March 19, 1941).
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change in existing agreements, wages, or working conditions; (b) full
information as to all -developments in labor disputes; and (c) . . . ad-
vance notice of any threatened interruptions .... ,"08 When a dispute
arose the Conciliation Service first tried to help the parties reach a
voluntary agreement between themselves. If that could not be done,
the conciliators retired from the scene, and the Secretary of Labor
certified the case to the Defense Mediation Board. The Conciliation
Service stuck to pure conciliation and persuasion without the use of
pressure. The Mediation Board first tried to settle the case by more
persuasion, or if the parties so desired, it would provide facilities for
arbitration. That failing, however, the Board would examine the facts
and publish its recommendation of how the dispute should be settled,
assessing blame to the guilty party.69 In this way the pressure of
public opinion was brought to bear on those who were obstructing na-
tional defense. No provision was made as to what would be done
when the dispute persisted after all these steps had been taken. In
three such cases the President found it necessary to order temporary
military occupation of the plant.
In practice the Board combined both mediation and arbitration.
Always it tried to get the parties to reach an agreement voluntarily,
because such an agreement was likely to be more lasting. Disputants
before the Board tended to be more than normally eager to reach a
voluntary agreement because they knew that failure to do so would be
taking a gamble on what the Board might recommend, and an uncom-
promising attitude would likely prejudice the Board members. There
can be little doubt that these "recommendations" by the Board came
to be the equivalent of orders, especially after it was shown that failure
to comply with a Board "recommendation" might result in military
seizure and operation of the trouble spot.70
Although the Conciliation Service continued-to bear the brunt of the
job of settling defense disputes, the Defense Mediation Board became
in a sense the more important of the two agencies. The cases which
involved a large amount of defense production or which proved espe-
cially difficult to handle were sooner or later certified to the Mediation
Board. It was in the public eye, and its decisions were usually regarded
as expressions of government policy, whether or not the Board so in-
tended. The principles on which it decided union security cases had a
large influence on the demands made by unions, on settlements reached
through collective bargaining, as well as on disputes mediated by the
8 lIbid.
8 LAB. Ryi .]REP. 84-85 (March 24, 1941).
"0 JAFFE AND RIcE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
(unpublished report done at the request of the National Defense Mediation Board,
Washington, 1942) Part II, p. 5.
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Conciliation Service or by the Board itself. Although the Board denied
that it acted according to any fixed policy, parties disputing over union
security tended to modify their demands in accordance with what they
thought the Board might recommend, as indicated by its decisions in
previous cases.
DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD CASES INVOLVING UNION SECURITY
This section will attempt to analyze the part that the government
played, through the Mediation Board, in the settlement of union security
disputes during the defense phase. Settlements made in cases coming
before the B6ard illustrate government policy when it was first being
formulated, policy which later was to point the way for the War Labor
Board. We can see what forms of union security were demanded, and
the principles by which the Board decided whether the demands should
be granted or refused.
Mediation Board cases were settled in two ways: by voluntary
agreements between the two parties, or by "recommendations" issued
by the Board in which the parties were directed to settle the dispute
in such and such a way. The distinction between the -two methods
of settlement was not always clear, however. It is difficult to tell where
the Board was acting as a mediator and where as an arbitrator. For
example, Board recommendations in some cases were merely statements
of agreements of the two parties reached by negotiations between them-
selves. On the other hand, in some cases where the Board never issued
a formal recommendation, the terms embodied in the agreement were
the result of suggestions from Board members, pressure exerted by
them in a certain direction, or hints as to what they would recommend
if a formal recommendation became necessary.71
Where the Board issued a recommendation the reasons as to why
a certain union security demand was granted or refused were usually
stated. Such a statement of the Board's opinion cannot be found in
cases settled by agreement, but they also reflect Board policy to a
greater or lesser degree. Agreements tended to follow pretty closely
the trend of recommendations, for a union would not be likely to sign
an agreement which granted it less than what it knew the Board had
given to some other union under similar circumstances.
Some form of union security was demanded in more than half of
the Board cases. These demands included the closed shop, union shop,
maintenance of union membership, preferential shop, discipline of anti-
union activity, employer encouragement of union membership, grievance
procedure designed to maintain union membership, check-off, promise
of cooperation with the union, and granting the union recognition as
"' Id. at Part II, p. 6.
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bargaining agent for the employees. Demands for union recognition
have been excluded from this -discussion, since that matter is primarily
the business of the National Labor Relations Board.
The demands made by a union in a dispute do not always give a
true indication of what the union was really seeking. No doubt in many
cases it asked for much more than it actually hoped to obtain, and
abandoned some of its claims in return for concessions by the employer.
For example, the union might throw in a union security demand when
actually it was seeking nothing but wage increases, or it might ask for
a closed shop when the most that it expected to get was maintenance
of membership. Moreover, the terminology of the demands is ambig-
uous. The union might demand what it called a "union shop" when
in reality the provisions it had in mind constituted a complete closed
shop. The employer, on the other hand, was.inclined to use the term
"closed shop" to designate any form of union security clause, no matter
how mild.
The Mediation Board handled a total of 118 separate cases. This
discussion covers forty-four cases involving the union security issues.
It does not include the union security cases settled without any hearing
before the Board, nor those cases involving union security which were
taken over by the National War Labor Board without the Mediation
Board having taken any formal action.
1. All-Union Shop.72 The Board never recommended an all-union
shop-except in the Bethlehem Shipbuilding case, 73 and then only because
of very specil circumstances. Through the influence of the govern-
ment, a master contract had been entered into by the shipbuilders and
unions on the Pacific coast for the purpose of stabilizing labor relations
in that area during the emergency. 74 All of the companies and the
unions had agreed to the contract except Bethlehem, which objected to
the closed shop provision. Apparently the company feared that the
granting of a closed shop in its shipbuilding division might pave the
way for similar demands in its other plants.75 The Board felt justified
in asking the company to sign the master agreement with its closed
shop clause because an overwhelming majority of the employers had
agreed to that specific clause, and the refusal of one company would
have defeated the effort to standardize and stabilize this important war
industry.76
" For a definition of the all-union shop see note 1 supra.
" Bethlehem Steel Company (Shipbuilding Division) and Bay Cities Metal
Trades Council (AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 37 (June 2,
1941).
118 LAB. REL. REP. 183 (April 7, 1941).
5 Id. at 467 (May 26, 1941).
76 JAFFE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 70, at Part II, p. 11.
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In only one case did a Board recommendation explicitly refuse an all-
union shop demand, the Captive Mines case.77 This dispute arose when
the United Mine Workers went on strike in the so-called "captive"
coal mines over the single issue of the union shop. The United Mine
Workers had already obtained the union shop in the commercial mines,
and felt themselves justified in asking for similar conditions in the mines
which were owned and operated by steel companies who used the coal
in their mills. Ninety per cent of the bituminous and anthracite coal
production was already under union shop conditions, and the union
wished to bring the remaining ten per cent under the standard aghee-
ment.7 8 Contrasted with the Bethlehem Shipbuilding dispute, here was
a case where a union had established standard union shop conditions in
the great majority of the country's anthracite and bituminous produc-
tion, and wished to "stabilize" the industry by applying the uniform
contract to the remaining minority.
The Board recommendation in the Captive Mines case, however,
refused the union shop demand, finding the situation different from
the Bethlehem case. The Board felt that in view of the union shop
conditions in the remainder of the coal industry, to grant the union
shop in the captive mines would have been equivalent to granting the
United Mine Workers by government decree a nation-wide monopoly
over employment in all coal mines. The Board felt that a government
agency like itself should not give such monopoly control to a private
association unregulated by the public.79 In the case of the Bethlehem
workers, establishment of a closed shop did not preclude the workers
from finding similar building trades employment elsewhere, but a union
shop in the captive mines would have meant that a man could not have
mined coal anywhere in the country unless he joined the union.8 0 The
union could not plead that the union shop demand was necessary to its
security, since ninety-five per cent of the miners in the captive mines
were already members.
8 1
The attitude of the Board in this case was that all-union shop
agreements were perfectly legal and completely justifiable when reached
through voluntary employer-employee bargaining, but that the govern-
ment itself would not order any party to make an all-union shop
agreement.
President Roosevelt supported the Board's action, saying that
"Bituminous Coal Operators (Captive Mines) and United Mine Workers of
America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No 20B (Nov. 12,
1941).
7, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 83 (Sept. 22, 1941).
" Frank P. Graham, A Concurring Opinion in the Captive Mines Dispute,
National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, Nov. 17, 1941.
"o JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 70, at Part II, pp. 11-12.
"National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, Nov. 11, 1941.
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" the Government of the United States will not order, nor will
Congress pass legislation, ordering a so-called closed shop."8 2
On this point the stand taken by the Board and the President was
inconsistent with the previous stand in the Bethlehem case. There the
government, through the Board, had "ordered" a closed shop, in spite
of the fact that the company had refused to do so on its own initiative.
The CIO members of the Board, Philip Murray and Thomas Ken-
nedy, dissented from the rest of the Board in this recommendation and
resigned in protest. The case was finally settled through voluntary
arbitration by the granting of the union shop in an award handed down
by an arbitration board composed of John L. Lewis, president of the
union, Benjamin Fairless, president of United States Steel, and John
R. Steelman, head of the Conciliation Service of the Department of
Labor. Although Steelman cast the deciding vote creating what the
Mediation Board had called a "labor monopoly," the government could
still maintain that it had not ordered a closed shop since Steelman had
been granted leave of absence from his job and acted unofficially. The
fact that the union shop existed in the commercial mines and that ninety-
five per cent of the captive miners were already members of the union-
which the Mediation Board had cited as reason for refusing the union
s.hop demand-Steelman cited as reasons for granting the union shop
demand. In addition he justified his vote on the grounds that the
award did not create a complete closed shop, since union membership
was open to anyone and union fees were low.
8 3
Some observers have thought it a bit curious to see one mediation
agency of the Federal Government absolutely refuse the union shop,
and then to see the head of another federal mediation agency grant the
union shop on the consideration of the same facts. It is difficult to see
how John R. Steelman on official leave of absence was a very different
person from John R. Steelman as head of the Conciliation Service.
Some have attempted to explain this apparent inconsistency by pointing
out that John L. Lewis made his union shop demand not long before
the annual CIO convention, at which Lewis desired to be elected presi-
dent. The chances of his being elected would have been greatly improved
had he come to the convention after having won the union shop for his
United Mine Workers. It is possible, so they say, that President
Roosevelt anticipated this possibility and prevented the granting of the
union shop until after the convention was over and Lewis had been
defeated by Philip Murray.
84
In the Employers' Negotiating Committee case,85 the Board recom-
2 National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished -Release, Nov. 18, 1941.
"89 LAB. REL. REP. 400-402 (Dec. 15, 1941).
" Lewas Loses the CIO (Dec. 1, 1941) 105 NEw REPUBLiC 722-724.
" Employers' Negotiating Committee (Puget Sound Area, Washington) and
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mended that the International Woodworkers of America (CIO) drop
their demand for a union shop and accept the company's offer of a
maintenance of membership clause, which had already been established
in a large part of the lumbering industry in that area.8 6
A union shop demand was temporarily refused by the Board in the
Alabama Dry Dock case,87 on the grounds that a contract was then in
effect which specifically stated that union membership was not a con-
dition of employment. The Board recommended that relations be
governed by the existing contract until the date of its expiration a
few weeks later.88
It might be said that in the cases where the Board refused demands
for the weaker forms of union security such as maintenance of mem-
bership, it would also have refused the stronger forms such as the
closed shop or union shop. It would be erroneous to conclude, however,
that in all of the numerous cases where union security was demanded
the failure to obtain the demand was due to a refusal by the Board.
In many of these cases the union security demand was not seriously
sought, but was dropped or swapped at some stage of the dispute.89
Several such all-union shop disputes were settled by agreements
between the two parties in which no provision was made for union
security, although the union had originally demanded it. In the John
A. Roebling's Sons Company case,90 the union security demand was
swapped for concessions on other issues.9 ' In the Continental Rubber
Works case,92 the union abandoned its all-union shop demand, and an
agreement was made on the other issues.93 In the Curtiss-Wright
case,9 4 instead of the union shop demand the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee was given a wage increase and exclusive bargaining rights.9
In addition to the provisions in the written contract, the employer
agreed to call twenty-four non-union employees to a meeting, at which
union representatives could try to persuade them to join the union. In
International Woodworkers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation
Board case No. 31 (May 8, 1941).
Bo National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, June 6, 1941.
8'Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company and Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (CIO), National Defense. Medi-
ation Board case No. 85 (Oct. 6, 1941).
8 National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, Nov. 18, 1941.
8o JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 70, at Appendix E, p. 3.
00John A. Roebling's Sons Company and Steel Workers Organizing Commit-
tee (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 18 (April 22, 1941).
:"JAFFE AND RiCE, op. cit. supra note 70, at Appendix E, p. 13.
o' Continental Rubber Works and United Rubber Workers of America (CIO),
National Defense Mediation Board case No. 27 (May 5, 1941).
"' National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, May 19, 1941.
"Curtiss-Wright Corporation (Curtiss Propeller Division) and Steel Workers
Organizing Committee (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 41
(June 12, 1941).
" National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, June 24, 1941.
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the Breeze Corporation case,98 the demand of the workers for a union
shop was refused, but a previous contract granting maintenance of
membership continued to operate.97 In the Rockford Drop Forge Com-
pany case,98 the unfavorable attitude of the panel toward the union shop
demand caused the union to drop it.99  In the Aluminum, Company
(Vernon, California, plant) case,100 the union shop issue was post-
poned at the Board's suggestion pending negotiation over a master con-
tract to cover other plants also, none of which bad the union shop.10'
To sum up the all-union shop cases, the Board recommended an
all-union shop in one case and explicitly recommended against it in
three cases. In no case was an all-union shop granted through vol-
untary agreement between the parties. Because of the impossibility of
determining the seriousness with which the many all-union shop de-
mands were made, it cannot be said how many voluntary agreements
contained actual refusal of an all-union shop.
2. Maintenance of Membership. A maintenance of membership
clause was recommended by the Board in seven cases, and was con-
tained in six contracts reached through voluntary agreements.
In the Employers' Negotiating Committee case, 102 the Board recom-
mended that the union abandon its union shop demand and accept the
company's offer of maintenance of membership.103
In the Columbia Basin Loggers case, 10 4 the Board recommendation
merely incorporated the maintenance of membership clause which repre-
sentatives of the parties bad agreed to in conferences with the aid of
Board members.10
When both the employer and employee members of the panel indi-
cated that they favored a maintenance clause, the company accepted
the recommendation in the Sealed Power case.'00
' Breeze Corporation, Inc. and United Automobile Workers of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 49 (July 12, 1941).7 JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 70, at Appendix E, p. 13.
" Rockford Drop Forge Company and International Brotherhood of Black-
smiths, Drop Forgers, and Helpers (AFL), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 63 (Aug..9, 1941).
"JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 70, at Appendix E, p. 13.
10 Aluminum Company .of America (Vernon, California, plant) and United
Automobile Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case
No. 56 (July 28, 1941).
2
0
-JAFFE AND RIcE, REPORT ON" THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
(unpublished report done at the request of the National Defense Mediation Board,
Washington, 1942) Appendix E, p. 13.
102 Employers' Negotiating Committee (Puget Sound Area, Washington) and
International Woodworkers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation
Board tase No. 31 (May 8, 1941).
10I National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, June 6, 1941.
104 Columbia Basin Area Loggers and Sawmill Operators and International
Woodworkers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No.
34 (May 12, 1941).
1 '"National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, June 5, 1941.
100 Sealed Power Corporation and International Union United Automobile
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In the four remaining cases the Board recommended maintenance
of membership in spite of strong objections made by the employers.
The North American Aviation Company'1" had been seized by Army
troops when members of the local union continued to strike in spite of
opposition by the national officers. The effect of the "wildcat" strike and
the subsequent Army occupation had tended to weaken the union. In
view of this situation the Board recommended maintenance of member-
ship as an aid to the union in putting employee relations back on a
stable basis.108
In the Western Cartridge case,10 9 the union was given maintenance
of membership to protect it against an employer who had continued to
oppose the union even during Mediation Board proceedings.' 10
In the Lincoln Mills case,"' the panel seemed to think that the
company would accept its recommendation of a modified maintenance
of membership clause, although it had refused such a clause for two
months, made no promise to agree to it, and later protested the recom-
mendation." 2 The maintenance of membership clause in this contract
was novel in that it contained an "escape clause," permitting withdrawal
from the union "for legitimate reasons" not related to wages, hours, and
conditions of employment, and subject to approval by a board of
review.'
11
The first big defense dispute of the war had begun back in May,
1940, at the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company 14 in Kearny,
New Jersey. During negotiations over union security provisions, five
thousand shipbuilders had become dissatisfied and ceased work on two
cruisers, two destroyers, three merchantmen, and two tankers for the
Navy." 5  This dispute flared up again and again for two years, to
plague first the Conciliation Service, then the Defense Mediation Board,
and finally the War Labor Board. The workers demanded a union
shop, whereas the employer refused to grant any kind of security.
When the case came before the Mediation Board, it recommended
Workers of America (AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 43
(June 21, 1941). JAFFE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 4.
"o North American Aviation, Inc. and United Automobile Workers of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 36 (May 22, 1941).
108 JAFE AND RIcE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Part II, p. 13.
10" Western Cartridge Company and Chemical Workers Local Union (AFL),
National Defense Mediation Board case No. 44 (June 24, 1941).
110 JAFFE AND Ricz, op. cit. supra note 101, at Part II, p. 13.
.. Lincoln Mills of Alabama and Textile Workers Union of America (CIO),
National Defense Mediation Board case No. 57 (July 28, 1941).2 JAFFE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 4.
1139 LAB. REL. REP. 181 (Oct. 20, 1941).
11. Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. and Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 46 (June 30, 1941).
"156 LAB. REL. REP. 484 (June 3, 1940).
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maintenance of membership. The Board felt that the union needed
some kind of protection since it had given up the right to strike, there
was a large influx of new workers, and the importance of the union to
the workers had been reduced somewhat by the signing of an Atlantic
coast master contract establishing uniform conditions in the shipbuilding
industry.1 6 The maintenance of membership provision read:
".. . the Company engaged on its part that any employee who is now a
member of the union, or who hereafter voluntarily becomes a member
luring the life of this agreement, shall, as a condition of continued
employment, maintain membership in the union in good standing."'"' T
The company refused to accept this "recommendation," however,
and the union protested by calling the workers out on strike once more.
As a result, President Roosevelt was forced to issue an order on August
23, 1941, for the Navy Department to seize and operate the plant.
18
Union maintenance was obtained in six cases through voluntary
agreements between the parties, with no formal recommendation by
the Board. The first and most important of these agreements was
reached on April 14, 1941, in the case of Weyerhaeuser Timber Com-
pany and Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Company." 9 During five days of
continuous mediation the panel informally suggested as a substitute for
the union shop demand that the company agree to encourage union
mdmbership and grant union maintenance. Both of these provisions
were accepted by the parties.120 The voluntary adoption of mainte-
nance of membership in this case later had a large effect in causing the
Board to recommend union maintenance in two other Pacific Northwest
lumber industry cases, Employers' Negotiating Committee,12' and Colum-
bia Basin Loggers.
22
In the Air Associates case, 23 the company president refused to
accept recommendations issued by the Board on issues not involving
union security. The plant was taken over by the Army and later re-
turned to a new president, while at the same time a contract was signed
"' 8JAMPE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Part II, p. 13.
8 LAB. REL. REP. 820 (Aug. 4, 1941).
1189 LAB. RIE.. REP. 4 (Sept. 1, 1941).
11. Weyerhaeuser Timber Company (Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Company) and
Puget Sound District Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (AFL), National Defense Mediation
Board case No. 5 (April 1, 1941).
"20JAFFE AND Ricm, op. cit. su pra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 8.
121 Employers' Negotiating Committee (Puget Sound Area, Washington) and
International Woodworkers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation
Board case No. 31 (May 8, 1941).
12 Columbia Basin Area Loggers .and Sawmill Operators and International
Woodworkers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No.
34 (May 12, 1941).
128 Air Associates, Inc. and United Automobile Workers of America (CIO),
National Defense Mediation Board case No. 51 (July 17, 1941).
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with the union granting maintenance of membership, strengthened by
a "harmony and goodwill" clause.
124
In the Utica Mohawk case,12 5 the offer of union maintenance in
place of an all-union shop demand had already been made by the em-
ployer before the case was certified to the Board, and was agreed to
without much Board influence. The clause in this case was weaker
than most maintenance provisions since it did not specifically require
the employer to fire employees who failed to maintain membership, but
required that the company "discipline" such employees and also any
workers engaging in anti-union activity.
2 6
A similar clause was agreed to in the American Cyanamid case
27
at the Board's suggestion. The company stated in the contract that it
"expects" employees to maintain membership, but instead of the usual
promise to discharge those who fail to do so, the company agreed
merely to call them into conference and remind them of their member-
ship obligation. In addition the company was to take disciplinary action
against any employee engaging in anti-union activity on company prop-
erty, and promised to supply new employees with a copy of the contract
and ask that they cooperate with the union.1
28
The clause agreed to in the Alabama By-Products case,'2 9 in addi-
tion to requiring that members maintain their good standing, required
also that new employees join the union.
8 0
The last Mediation Board case settled by an agreement providing
union maintenance was in Hammond and Iring.13' Here the clause
applied only to those employees who voluntarily signed, a pledge
agreeing to place themselves under the maintenance of membership'
provision.'3
2
Board recommendations embodying specific refusal of union main-
tenance were handed down in three cases: Alabama Dry Docks, Ingalls
Shipbuilding, and Sloss-Sheffield. ,
In the Alabama Dry Docks cases the Board recommended that the
12 9 LAB. REL. REP. 517 (Jan. 18, 1942).
... Utica and Mohawk Cotton Mills and Textile Workers Union of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 23 (April 30, 1941).
.. JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 8.
12"American Cyanamid Company and Chemical Workers Union (AFL), Na-
tional Defense Mediation Board case No. 88 (Oct. 7, 1941).1289 LAB. RE. REP. 488-489 (Jan. 5, 1942).
1 "'Alabama By-Products Corporation and United Mine Workers of America,
District 50 (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 95 (Oct. 20,
1941). 0 JAFFE AND RIcE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 8.
121 Hammond and Irving Company and International Association of Machinists
(AFL), and International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths, Drop Forgers, and Help-
ers (AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 111 (Dec. 15, 1941).
122 National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, Jan. 12, 1942.
Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company and Industrial Union of
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parties continue to operate under the existing contract until its ex-
piration. 34 Although the recommendation in the Ingalls Shipbuilding
case' 8 5 refused maintenance of membership, it 'did grant preferential
hiring, encouragement of union membership, shop discipline and griev-
ance procedure.'3 6 At Sloss-Sheffield 8 " a partial substitute was granted
in the form of a shop discipline clause.' 88
In some cases no formal Board recommendation was issued refusing
union maintenance, but the Board informally expressed opposition dur-
ing the course of the proceedings. Examples are the Armour and
Company case,189 the Borg-Warner Corporation case,140 and the.Rock-
ford Drop Forge Company case.' 4' Such opposition by the panel could
be expressed in various ways and in varying degrees of firmness. Mere
questions by the panel chairman as to why union maintenance was
demanded showed that the panel was opposed to granting it in cases
like Erwin Cotton Mills142 and Pullman Standard Car Company.
143
3. Preferential Hiring. Preferential hiring of union members was
granted in three Board recommendations, but in no voluntary agree-
ments. In each of the three cases the recommendation was offered as
an alternative to an all-union shop, and in each case the terms of the
recommendation had already been agreed to by the employer. In the
Columbia Basin Loggers case 4 4 the preferential hiring provision was
merely an agreement between the parties to continue the hiring pro-
cedure which had been practiced in the past. 45 In the Todd Galveston
Drydocks case, 146 the recommendation merely stated: "... The corn-
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Medi-
ation Board case No. 85 (Oct. 6, 1941).
. "'JAFE AND RIcE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 5.
"'Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation and Pascagoula Metal Trades Council
(AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 92 (Oct. 15, 1941).
"'9 LAB. REL. REP. 326 (Nov. 17, 1941).
"' Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Company and United Mine Workers of
America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 94 (Oct. 20, 1941).
.. JAM AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 5.
"'Armour and Company and Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 54 (July 26, 1941).
"0 Borg-Warner Corporation and United Automobile Workers of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 55 (July 26, 1941).
'"Rockford Drop Forge Company and International Brotherhood of Black-
smiths, Drop Forgers, and Helpers (AFL), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 63 (Aug. 9, 1941).
12 Erwin Cotton Mills Company and Textile Workers Union of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 59 (Aug. 6, 1941).
" ' Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Company (Michigan City, Ind.) and
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America (AFL), National Defense Medi-
ation Board case No. 71 (Aug. 26, 1941).
... Columbia Basin Area Loggers and Sawmill Operators and International
Woodworkers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No.
34 (May 12, 1941).
" 'JAFFE AND Ric, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 3.
'.Todd Galveston Drydocks and Galveston Metal Trades Council (AFL),
and International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers
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pany looks with favor on its employees becoming members of the
Union, parties to this agreement.'1 47  This clause in itself obviously
does not provide for preferential hiring. However, there existed at this
shipyard an oral understanding which amounted to a preferential or
even a union shop agreement, and the clause recommended seemed to
contain a tacit understanding that past practice would continue.148  In
the Ingalls Shipbuilding case,' 49 the Board recommended- a contract in
which the employer promised to encourage the union, to discourage any
rival unionism, and to show preference in hiring to union men. 5 0 In the
American Potash and Chemical case, 1'r no recommendation was made,
but during the hearings the Board informally suggested preferential
hiring152
4. Discipline of Anti-Union Activity. In several cases the fear of
the union for its security was partly met by an employer promise to
discipline any workers engaging in activities which might undermine
the status of the "in" union, especially such things as organizing for a
rival union. Usually a discipline clause was combined with other minor
union security provisions which together acted as a substitute for
maintenance of membership or an all-union shop.
Three Board recommendations contained shop discipline provisions
of this type. In the Phelps-Dodge Copper Products case,ies along with
a cooperation clause, the employer promised to discipline ". . . those
who by their conduct on the premises interfered with the production
of the plant."' 5 4  In Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation5 5 the Board
recommended that the union accept the company's offer of pfeferential
hiring coupled with a promise to discipline employees who attempted
to undermine the contract. 56 In Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Cor-
of America (AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 62 (Aug. 7,
1941).
'" JAFFE AND RIcE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 3.
148 Ibid.
... Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation and Pascagoula Metal Trades Council
(AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 92 (Oct. 15, 1941).
1x0 9 LAB. RE. REP. 326-327 (Nov. 24, 1941).
"I American Potash and Chemical Corporation and International Union of
Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 19.
. lCJAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 101, at Appendix E, p. 4.
... Phelps-Dodge Copper Products Corporation and United Electrical, Radio,
and Machine Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 10 (April 8, 1941).1"'JAFFE AND RicE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
(unpublished report prepared at the request of the National Defense Mediation
Board, Washington, 1942) Appendix E, p. 6.
"I Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation and Pascagoula Metal Trades Council
(AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 92 (Oct. 15, 1941).
... JAFFE AND RicE, loc. cit. supra note 154.
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poration,157 the Board recommendation embodied the following: "The
company will not tolerate and will discipline any employee who, on
company time, carries on anti-union activities or seeks to interfere with
the membership or status of this union."'
158
Eleven voluntary agreements embodied shop discipline clauses
granted in answer to union security demands. In the Allis-Chalmers
(Milwaukee) case, 159 the CIO union went on strike in January, 1941,
to support a demand for "protection" against the organizing drive of
the rival AFL union.' 60  An agreement was reached through the OPM
involving a promise by the company to discipline employees doing any-
thing to disrupt peaceful relations in the plant. The dispute arose anew,
however, over differing interpretations as to what constituted disruptive
activities. The company charged that the union wanted it to discipline
members for dues delinquency, thus making the clause equivalent to
maintenance of membership. The agreement finally signed was the
result of strong pressure from the Board, almost equivalent to a recom-
mendation. At the company's insistence it contained a clause specifically
stating that failure to pay dues was not in itself cause for discipline.
The company promised, however, to prevent any rival union from
organizing on company pr9perty, and agreed to a statement saying:
"It is expected that by union members remaining in good standing...
interference with shop discipline will be reduced."' 1 An impartial
referee was to decide what activities constituted disruption of shop dis-
cipline. This agreement became the basis for similar settlement of
disputes in two other plants, Allis-Chalmers (Pittsburgh),0 2 and Allis-
Chalmers (Laporte, Ind.). 63
In Cowles Tool Company,'6 4 the Board assigned a commissioner of
the Conciliation Service to help the parties negotiate, and a settlement
was reached along the lines of that in the Standard Tool Company
case,'6 5 providing a shop discipline clause, exclusive recognition, use
of plant bulletin boards, and promise of harmonious relations.'L0
"" Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Company and United Mine Workers of
America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 94 (Oct. 20, 1941).
... JAFFz AiN RIcE, loc. cit. supra note 154.
. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company (Milwaukee plant) and United
Automobile Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case
No. 6 (April 2, 1941). "1 7 LAB. R SL REP. 549 (Jan. 27, 1941).
'" National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, April 6, 1941.
. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company (Pittsburgh plant) and United
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (CIO), National Defense
Mediation Board case No. 26 (May 3, 1941).
.. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company (Laporte, Ind., plant) and United
Farm Equipment Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 32 (May 7, 1941).
I" Cowles Tool Company and United Automobile Workers of America (CIO),
National Defense Mediation Board case No. 9 (April 5, 1941).
"G Standard Tool Company and United Automobile Workers of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 8.
26118 LAB. Rr. REP. 265 (April 28, 1941).
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In Utica Mohawk Company,167 the parties reached an agreement
without suggestion by the Board, providing shop discipline along with
maintenance of membership.1 68
The United Engineering and Foundry Company case16" involved a
demand by the union for an all-union shop based on the alleged un-
friendly attitude of the employer. The company requested that the
Board offer some alternative to an all-union shop, whereupon the
Board suggested and the parties agreed to a clause prohibiting anti-
union conduct. The union in turn promised not to solicit members on
company time or property.
170
The agreement in Cheney Silk17 ' included shop -discipline along'with
a voluntary check-off and a promise by the company to encourage
union membership1 72
In Borg-Warner Corporation,1" 3 the union demanded preferential
hiring and the check-off. The Board indicated that it would not recom-
mend any union security clauses, so the union agreed to the company's
offer of a shop discipline clause which specified that non-payment of
dues did not call for discipline.'
74
A suggestion by the Board in Lamson and Sessions Company"7
5
was embodied in an agreement providing for discipline of employees
who engaged in activities which interfered with the status of the
union.170
A similar agreement was reached in American Brake Shoe and
Foundry Company,177 largely independent of influence from the Board.
The company stated that it "has no objection to any of its employees
being members of the union," and promised to discipline anti-union
activity in the plant, in return for a promise by the union not to conduct
its activities on company time.'
78
In American Cyanamid Company,"79 the disputants agreed to Board
... Utica and Mohawk Cotton Mills and Textile Workers Union of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 23 (April 30, 1941).
"'
8
JAFFE AND RIcE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 11.
.0. United Engineering and Foundry Company and Steel Workers Organizing
Committee (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 30 (May 9, 1941).
19 LAB. REL. REP. 540 (Jan. 19, 1942).
171 Cheney Brothers and Textile Workers Union of America (CIO), National
Defense Mediation Board case No. 47 (July 2, 1941).
"'JAFFE AND RPcE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 11.
L1 8 Borg-Warner Corporation and United Automobile Workers of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 55 (July 26, 1941).
JAFFE AND RIcE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 11.
'7 8 Lamson and Sessions Company and United Automobile Workers of Amer-
ica (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 75 (Sept. 6, 1941).1 7
1 JAFFE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 11.
"" American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company and International Molders
and Foundry Workers Union of America (AFL), National Defense Mediation
Board case No. 76 (Sept. 10, 1941).
1"89 LAB. RE.L. REP. 162 (Oct. 13, 1941).
"'American Cyanamid Company and Chemical Workers Union (AFL), Na-
tional Defense Mediation Board case No. 88 (Oct. 7, 1941).
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suggestions which, in addition to a modified union maintenance clause,
provided for shop discipline and a corresponding promise by the union
not to engage in union activities on company time. The company fur-
ther agreed to give new employees a copy of the contract and ask them
to cooperate in carrying out its provisions. 80
5. Enc'ouragemen of Union Membership, Cooperation, etc. In
several cases where the Board did not see fit to recommend one of the
stronger forms of union security clauses, it endeavored to alleviate the
fears of the union by requiring the employer to cooperate with the
union in other ways. Devices of this sort included encouragement by
the employer of union membership, promises by the employer to pro-
mote harmonious relations with the union, providing new employees
with copies of the union contract, use by the union of bulletin boards
in the plant, agreement not to discriminate against union members, and
shop discipline clauses such as those discussed above.
In Phelps-Dodge,'s ' in addition to the discipline provision, the
Board suggested (rather than "recommended") the following clause:
"The union and the employer agree that at all times they will use
their best efforts and endeavors to promote and maintain harmonious,
friendly, and cooperative relations between the employee and the union.
... When a new employee is hired, he will be informed of the existence
of the union and of this agreement."'
18 2
In Columbia Basin Loggers'83 the Board recommended, in addition
to maintenance, of membership and preferential hiring, that the employer
suggest to new workers that they join the union.'8 4
In Todd Galveston Drydocks,8 5 the company was directed to sign
an agreement saying that "it looks with favor upon its employees be-
coming members of the unions, parties to this agreement." This was
combined with a preferential hiring understanding.18 6 In Ingalls Ship-
building Corporation,87 instead of an all-union shop the Board recom-
mended a combination of preferential hiring, shop discipline, and a
1
*JAFFE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 11.
... Phelps-Dodge Copper Products Corporation and United Electrical, Radio,
and Machine Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board
case No. 10 (April 8; 1941).
... JAFFE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 5.
... Columbia Basin Area Loggers and Sawmill Operators and International
Woodworkers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No.
34 (May 12, 1941).
... JAFFE AND RICE, oP. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 5.
18. Todd Galveston Drydocks and Galveston Metal Trades Council (AFL),
and International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers
of America (AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 62 (Aug. 7,
1941).
"'JAFFE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 5.
11 7 Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation and Pascagoula Metal Trades Council
(AFL), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 92 (Oct. 15, 1941).
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statement by the company saying it "advocated" that union members
remain in good standing and that "the interests of the employees are
best served by being members of the union." 8 8
In Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Corporation,189 the Board recom-
mended discipline of anti-union activities and the statement that
"the company has good will toward membership in the certified union
as a basic part of our industry and a vital partner in defense produc-
tion. The company and union agree to cooperate for harmonious
relations, orderly and efficient shop discipline, and maximum defense
production."'90
In Sklar Manufacturing Company,'9 ' the only provision in the
recommended settlement having to do with union security was a
strengthening of grievance procedure.
192
Several cases settled by voluntary agreements provided for encour-
agement of union membership by the employer. Cases in which this
was combined with other union security provisions have been noted
above. The mildest possible form of union encouragement was agreed
to in Curtis Manufacturing Company,93 in which the company merely
recognized in writing the legally established right of the employees to
join the union94
In Ex-Cell-O Corporation,'9" the employer agreed to a statement
that it was important for members of the union to remain in good
standing. In return the union signed a clause similar to clauses found in
many maintenance of membership agreements, promising that "neither
the union nor its members will intimidate or coerce any employee in
respect to his right to work or in respect to union activity, membership
or non-membership."' 1 6
Provision for grievance procedure in Kellogg Switchboard Sup-
ply, 97 and in Pullman Standard Car Company (Michigan City), 198 was
... JAFFE AND RicE loc. cit. supra note 154..8 Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Company and United Mine Workers of
America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 94 (Oct. 20, 1941).
.
1oJAFFE AND RicE, loc. cit. supra note 154.
.9.J. Sklar Manufacturing Company and United Electrical, Radio, and Ma-
chine Workers of America (CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No.
11 (April 9, 194-1).
..
2 JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 7.
"' Curtis Manufacturing Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 25 (May 2, 1941).
JA "E AND RIcE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 12.
188 Ex-Cell-O Corporation and United Automobile Workers of America (CIO),
National Defense Mediation Board case No. 29 (May 8, 1941).
JAMFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 12.
Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company and International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers (AFL), International Association of Machinists (AFL),
National Defense Mediation Board case No. 16 (April 21, 1941).
188 Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Company (Michigan City, Ind.) and
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America (AFL), National Defense Medi-
ation Board case No. 71 (Aug. 26, 1941).
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supposed to answer in some degree the demand for union security.100
The American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company 200 refused to
make a statement that it approved of union membership on the grounds
that such a statement was merely another form of the closed shop. In-
stead it agreed to discipline anti-union activities
20 '
6. Check-Off. In no case was a check-off of union dues included
among the provisions of a Board recommendation. However, it was
embodied in two negotiated agreements, both containing "escape"
clauses. In Chetey Brothers202 an employee's check-off authorization
was irrevocable except for "legitimate reasons.., not related to wages,
hours, and conditions of employment," and subject to the review of an
employer-employee committee. Combined with this provision were
shop discipline and membership encouragement clauses.
20 3
In Erwin Cotton Mills,2 0 4 the check-off arrangement was much the
same except that disputes over the "escape" provision were to be settled
between the union and the employees involved, with the company taking
no part. In case of failure to agree, an arbitrator was to be selected by
Board member Frank P. Graham, or by the American Arbitration
Association.
205
THE COLLAPSE OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
It is significant that the issue of union security which had been the
most controversial and difficult question to concern the National De-
fense Mediation Board was the one which also was to bring about its
destruction. The Mediation Board came to an end as a result of the
struggle between the CIO and the government as to whether or not a
union shop should be established in the captive coal mines.
When the Mediation Board on November 10 voted nine-to-two not
to grant the union shop in the captive mines, two dissenting votes were
cast by the CIO members, Philip Murray and Thomas Kennedy. In
their minority opinion they stated that the facts were essentially the
same as in the Bethlehem Shipbuilding case where the Board had
ordered a closed shop. They accused the Board of failing to consider
the case on its merits, and charged that "henceforth regardless of the
... JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 154, Appendix E, p. 13.
0
'American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company and International Molders
and Foundry Workers Union of America (AFL), National Defense Mediation
Board case No. 76 (Sept. 10, 1941).2
°
1
JAwE AND RICE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 13.
202 Cheney Brothers and Textile Workers Union of America (CIO), National
Defense Mediation Board case No. 47 (July 2, 1941).
203 JAFFE AND RicE,. op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, pp. 8-9.
"o'Erwin Cotton Mills Company and Textile Workers Union of America
(CIO), National Defense Mediation Board case No. 59 (Aug. 6, 1941).20 3 JAFFE AND RicE, op. cit. supra note 154, at Appendix E, p. 9.
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merits of any case, labor unions must be denied the right of normal
growth and legitimate aspirations, such as the union shop, and the
traditional open shop policy of the anti-labor employer must prevail."
They further stated that the decision as an expression of national policy
"endangers all unions and threatens to rip asunder peaceful industrial
relations ...where a union shop has already been established." The
majority decision, they said, "made it impossible for labor to retain any
confidence in the Board's future actions. '20 6 Thereupon Mr. Murray,
Mr. Kennedy and all other CIO members resigned from the Board.
After these resignations the Board practically ceased to function.
Without CIO members, hearings in cases involving CIO unions were
suspended and no new CIO cases could be taken over, while the re-
maining members attempted to bring to a close as best they could the
AFL cases. During this period some of the Board's work was taken
over by the Conciliation Service, which attempted to function in the
same manner as the Mediation Board had done.
207
President Roosevelt attempted without success to get the CIO mem-
bers to return to their duties on the Board. Murray defended their
action before the national convention and charged that "the opposition
of employers to the union shop is only a last stand to their opposition
to complete collective bargaining."
208
UNION SECURITY UNDER THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD
EVENTS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOARD
During the "defense" period of America's participation in World
War II, controversies in the field of industrial relations had been
handled by the National Defense Mediation Board. This Board, estab-
lished with the benefit of much prestige and publicity, had performed
its task effectively until November, 1941, when it fell to pieces over the
captive mines controversy. Thus, when the United"States officially de-
clared war in December and began an all-out effort to defeat the Axis
powers, the government was without any agency for the maintenance of
peace on the production lines.
Legislative Proposals. The collapse of the Mediation Board over
the issue of union security seemed to indicate what some observers had
always contended-that union security should not be decided by a
mediation agency, but should be settled according to a fixed govern-
ment policy enunciated by Congress. Early in 1941 a group of bills
had been introduced in Congress to outlaw the closed shop or to freeze
union status for the duration of the war. Consideration of these bills
20 National Defense Mediation Board Unpublished Release, Undated.
20 9 LAB. REL. Rs. 366 (Dec. 8, 1941).
o'Id. at 300 (Nov. 24, 1941).
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had been halted by the creation of the Mediation Board, which Presi-
dent Roosevelt said would bring strikes to a halt and make such legis-
lation unnecessary.
Upon the apparent failure of the government to settle union security
disputes through the Defense Mediation Board, new attempts were
made to force a settlement of the issue by enactment of Congress.
Representative Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, introduced a bill to
make it unlawful:
".... for a defense contractor, by discrimination in regard to hire, terms
or tenure of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization, unless such discrimination is required by the
terms of a contract or agreement with a labor organization entered
into prior to the date of the enactment of this Act which complies with
the provisions of section 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
or by the terms of any voluntary subsequent -contract or agreement with
the same labor organization." 20 9
This measure passed the House on December 3, and was sent to
the Senate for consideration. On the next day the Senate Committee
on Education and Labor reported the Ball Bill also directed against
strikes. In contrast with the Smith Bill, it forbade the granting of an
all-union shop only to a union which had struck for that purpose within
a year, penalties being provided for any employer who granted it in
violation of the act.210 The Herring Bill would have frozen existing
closed shop agreements, made new ones unlawful, and prohibited the
Mediation Board from recommending union contracts.
211
The Conference of Labor and Industry. Consideration of legisla-
tion to prohibit strikes and outlaw the all-union shop was interrupted
by the course of events. Soon after Pearl Harbor the leaders of the
national labor unions gave President Roosevelt their pledge that they
would do their utmost to prevent any labor dispute from developing
into a strike under any circumstances. On December 11, the President
announced the calling of an Industry-Labor Conference, for the pur-
pose of reaching "a unanimous agreement to prevent the interruption
of production by labor disputes during the period of war."12 12 Since
unions were not to resort to the strike as a means of deciding disputes,
some agency had to be established to settle labor controversies by
peaceful means.
A similar conference had been called in World War I previous to
the establishment of the National War Labor Board of 1918. In those
days the closed shop was not a major question, but this time the main
209 H. R. 6149, 87 CoN. REc. 9317 (1941).
210 S. 683, 87 CONa. REc. 9403 (1941).
211S. 2042, 87 CONG. REC. 9020 (1941).
2129 LAB. REL. REP. 393 (Dec. 15, 1941).
[Vol. 21
1943] THE CLOSED SHOP ISSUE IN WORLD WAR 11 165
fight was over whether or not the new National War Labor Board
should consider union security disputes. The National Association of
Manufacturers, representing the employer point of view, had taken the
position that "such a private conference between management and labor
cannot and should not undertake to formulate the nation's labor policy.
That policy, like other policies which govern the nation, are the sole
responsibility of the Congress and the President. '213  On the other
hand, the CIO opposed freezing of union status, and took the stand
that the establishment and extension of the all-union shop would have
a stabilizing effect on labor relations, while prohibition of it would
increase strikes.
214
The conference was deadlocked for several days over this contro-
versy. Finally they made a statement of three general points of agree-
ment: (1) There shall be no strikes or lockouts. (2)- All disputes
shall be settled by peaceful means. (3) The President shall set up a
proper War Labor Board to handle these disputes. This agreement
was presented to the President, but with the employer members making
the important reservation that in their opinion the issue of union
security should not be considered by the proposed board. They stated,
however, that they would abide by whatever the President decided on
this point. Thus the conference never really reached any agreement on
union security, but left the decision up to the President.
215
President Roosevelt "accepted" the three points, and by his silence
on the reservation made by the employers decided in favor of the labor
members that the new board should decide all disputes, not excluding
disputes over union security. 216 The employer members in turn
"accepted" the President's decision, but issued a formal statement re-
iterating their previous stand. They said in part:
... the board should not accept for consideration the issue of the
closed shop....
We recommend that, for the duration of the war, employers shall
not attempt to change the terms, in present contracts, which provide
for the closed shop.- Where a closed shop contract does not now exist,
it may under the law be arrived 'at by voluntary negotiation. We en-
dorse without reservation the, right of labor to organize and bargain
collectively.
But it would be a serious mistake to abandon the principle that the
right to work should not be infringed by government through require-
ment of membership in any organization whether union or otherwise.
The closed shop is, the most highly controversial and emotional
question in industrial relations today. To accept it as an issue for
government arbitration would' intensify agitation, increase labor dis-
2139 LAB. REL. REP. 426 (Dec. 22, 1941).
23LA Ibid.
21 Id. at 461 (Dec. 29, 1941). 216 Ibid.
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putes and divert the energy of both labor and management from the
vital job of production. Unless this issue is resolved in advance, it will
impair the effectiveness of the proposed War Labor Board itself. From
our experience we are convinced that the continual presentation of this
issue before government agencies would seriously impair the nation's
productive activities.
'2 17
In addition to the employer members of the Board, the position that
union security should be excluded from consideration by the new Board
was backed by such men as Charles E. Wyzanski and William M.
Leiserson. Mr. Wyzanski, formerly a public member of the Mediation
Board, stated that:
".... unless the national organizations of employers and employees
agree upon, or Congress prescribes, a policy upon this issue, an exec-
utive board which tries unaided to deal with the issue will not last
long. It will eventually meet defiance from an employer as strong as
United States Steel or a union leader as strong as John Lewis and that
defiance will gain strength because the Board cannot point to the breach
of an established rule."
218
Mr. Leiserson, member of the National Labor Relations Board,
predicted that if the War Labor Board attempted to decide each case
"on its merits" as the Mediation Board had done, it too would likely
collapse as the result of disagreement by the employer and labor mem-
bers over union security. Further, he stated:
"Again, suppose the Labor Board grants maintenance of union mem-
bership or some other form of closed shop in its first few decisions;
these will establish precedents on which unions are bound to rely in
bringing new disputes before the Board. If they are used as precedents
and subsequent decisions are made accordingly, will not the question be
asked: 'Why bother bringing up one case after another?' Why not
announce in advance that the government has adopted the policy of
guaranteeing 'union security' by compelling membership in labor
organizations and thus avoid bringing numerous controversiqs before
the Board for decision? If the first decisions, do not set precedents,
but indicate that sometimes 'union security' will be granted and some-
times not, then will not local unions throughout the country take this
to mean that they must create controversies in order to get their cases
up to the Board, to find out whether they are entitled to union security
or not? Already national unions have announced they are instructing
their locals to ask for union shops and wage increases in renewing their
agreements with employers.
In either case war production will be impeded unless broad policies
are determined in advance and people may know what to expect in the
way of compulsory union membership or wage adjustments, in relation
to cost of living. Thus are controversies prevented from arising and
2179 LAn. RLi. REP. 462 (Dec. 29, 1941).
... Id. at 546 (Jan. 19, 1942).
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employers and workers can adjust -differences themselves on the basis
of the general policy.
* ' * It is preferable both for efficiency reasons and for the sake of
national unity, that the policies which are to govern labor relations in
war industries be worked out by mutual agreement and consent so fat
as possible. . . If, however, we do not find a way of working out
successfully this method of consent, or mutual agreement, or voluntary
partnership in a common enterprise, then of course the only alternative
will be for Congress to legislate what the policies should be.
... If the War Labor Conference were reconvened and the policy
problems now facing the Board were referred to it for study and
formulation in the light of possible Congressional action and the none
too bright war situation, I think the method of mutual agreement might
still prevail and the War Labor Board function successfully."
2 19
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD
In spite of the lack of agreement by the Industry-Labor Conference
on the question of union security, and in spite of prophecies that the
War Labor Board would likewise collapse over this issue, President
Roosevelt on January 12 issued an executive order creating the Na-
tional War Labor Board for the peaceful adjustment of all labor dis-
putes except those for which other means had been provided. 22 0 The
procedure set down for settling disputes called for first an attempt at
direct negotiation between the parties. If the case was not settled in
this manner, the Conciliation Service was to be notified, if it had not
already intervened. If conciliation did not secure a prompt settlement,
the Secretary of Labor was to certify the case to the Board, provided,
however, that the Board could take jurisdiction of any dispute on its
own initiative after .consulting with the Secretary of Labor. "After it
takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute, and
for this purpose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitra-
tion under rules established by the Board.' 221 By the same executive
order the Mediation Board ceased to exist, and all of its employees,
records, papers, property, unexpended funds and appropriations, and
twenty-three unsettled disputes were taken over by the new Board.
z2
To an important degree the War Labor Board was just the Medi-
ation Board with a new name. Many apparent differences proved to
be theoretical rather than actual. For example, the War Labor Board
was specifically given the power of compulsory arbitration while the
old Board was directed merely to issue findings and recommendations.
These "recommendations," however, had been in effect almost the same
.1 Diagnosis of War Labor Policy (Feb. 23, 1942) 9 LAD. REL REP. 727.
_" Executive Order No. 9017, January 12, 1942.
221 Ibid.
.22 Defense Mediation Board cases taken over by the War Labor Board: 4, 31,
46, 58, 60, 65, 66, 67, 83, 84, 89, 91, 92, 93, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 110, 113,
and 114.
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as arbitration awards, and failure to accept them resulted in govern-
ment seizure of several plants. About the only difference was that
failure to accept a Mediation Board "recommendation" was not so
plainly an act of defiance against the government as refusal of a War
Labor Board "order."
No agreement between labor and industry had preceded the forma-
tion of the Mediation Board, but neither was the pre-War Labor Board
conference successful in reaching an agreement on the most important
issue, union security.
The War Labor Board was directed to make final determination of
its cases, while the Mediation Board had merely been authorized to
make all reasonable efforts to settle a case, and failing to do so to issue
recommendations. Actually, however, there was little the new Board
could do which the old Board had not done, because when either a
"recommendation" or an "order" was resisted, compliance had to be
enforced through the war powers of the President. The order to
"finally determine" disputes constituted a change only to the extent
that this time the President seemed to have his mind made up that the
new Board would settle its cases as it saw fit and that no union or
employer or government agency was to stand in the way.
There were certain important advantages which the War Labor
Board had over its predecessor, however. Whereas the Mediation
Board had merely promises of cooperation from the labor leaders in
trying to keep strikes at a minimum, the War Labor Board had behind
it an outright promise by labor leaders to do all possible to prevent any
strikes at all, a promise which meant more because of the fact that war
had been declared.
The power of the War Labor Board to take jurisdiction of a case
on its own initiative guarded against any possible reluctance by the
Department of Labor to certify a case, for fear that certification indi-
cated inefficiency on the part of the Conciliation Service.
There seemed to be less likelihood that the War Labor Board would
face a walk-out by some of its members similar to the resignation by
the CIO members of the Mediation Board. Labor had accomplished
nothing by that protest except to put itself in a bad light. Labor leaders
knew that if they staged a walk-out on the War Labor Board the result
would probably be the passage of repressive anti-strike legislation by an
enraged Congress. Or at best, disputes would be handled by a board
of public members, on which labor Would have no representation.
The new Board seemed to have more emphatic backing from the
President, and had been specifically granted certain powers which the
Mediation Board could use only in a roundabout fashion. Most im-
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portant of all, the new Board could profit from the experiences of the
old, especially since much of the personnel was the same.
Whatever the other differences or similarities, the most important
point for the present discussion is this: Under the War Labor Board
as under the Mediation Board, disputes over union security were still
to be settled individually according to the merits of the case rather
than according to any announced policy.
WAR LABOR BOARD CASES INVOLVING UNION SECURITY
The change in name of the government mediation board did not
mean much change in the procedure by which disputes were settled.
Under the War Labor Board the two chief methods of settlement were
still voluntary agreements and Board decisions. Board decisions, which
had been called "recommendations" by the Defense Mediation Board,
were now called "directive orders" by the War Labor Board. A third
method of settlement was used by the War Labor Board, however, by
virtue of its added power to settle cases through arbitration.
This discussion covers the work of the War Labor Board from the
time of its inception through August, 1942. During this period the
Board took jurisdiction of approximately 450 cases, including the
twenty-three which the Mediation Board had left unsolved and the
War Labor Board inherited. Out of this total of 450, some form of
union security demand was made in approximately 240 cases. The pres-
ent discussion will cover the ninety-four union security cases which had
been settled by the end of August, 1942.
1. Maintenance of Memzbership. In solving union security cases,
the Defense Mediation Board had come to the conclusion that the all-
union shop was all right when reached by voluntary agreement, but
that no government agency should compel the making of such a con-
tract. Rather than order a union shop in the captive coal mines the
Mediation Board had suffered collapse. This position was in keeping
with the President's declaration that the government would not order
a closed shop. As an alternative to a closed shop or union shop, the
Mediation Board in a large number of cases had adopted some form
of maintenance of membership clause as a compromise that would pro-
tect the unions from the weakening effect of the war and the no-strike
agreement, but without penalizing the employer or infringing upon the
liberty of the individual employee. Although no formal statement was
made to that effect, it was clear that the War Labor Board would con-
tinue the policy of refusing to order an all-union shop. Thus the
history of union security cases coming before the War Labor-Board is
a continuation of compromise solutions, the chief of which was main-
tenance of membership.
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Out of the ninety-four union security cases settled by the War
Labor Board by the end of August, 1942, fifty-seven of these settle-
ments contained some kind of maintenance of membership clause.
Thirty-seven were granted in orders by the Board, eighteen were con-
tained in voluntary agreements, and two were awarded by arbitrators.
These maintenance of membership clauses were of several types,
and can best be studied by following the decisions of the Board week
by week as the form was gradually changed, until by June, 1942, they
had evolved the so-called "standard" clause. Such a chronological
analysis shows the development of the Board's thinking as it tried to
devise a compromise solution which would most nearly meet the needs
of the unions and offer the least objection.
The first maintenance of membership clauses obtained in War
Labor Board cases were reached through voluntary agreements in late
January and February, 1942, before the new Board had made any
definite decision on union security. These were the cases of Western
Machine Tool Works,2 2 Bendix Aviation Corporation,22 4 and Robert
Jacobs Shipyards, Inc.2 2 5  The clause in the Robert Jacobs case is
typical of these early maintenance provisions:
"All present employees who are members of the I. U. of M. and
S. W. of A., Local 38, or employees who shall hereinafter voluntarily
become members of the Union shall remain members of said Union in
good standing during the term of this agreement. '220
On February 4, the Marshall Field2 27 case was settled by an agree-
ment containing an unusual maintenance of membership clause, which
came to be known as the "Marshall Field formula" and was copied
in several later contracts. It read as follows:
"All employees who are now members of the Union or who may in
the future become members will be required as a condition of employ-
ment with the Company to maintain their membership in goad standing
during the life of the contract: Provided, that this provision shall apply
only to employees, who, after the consummation of this agreement,
individually and voluntarily certify in uriting that they authorize union
dues deductions, and will, as a condition of employment, maintain their
membership in the union in good standing during the life of the con-
tract. Upon receipt of the above authorization, the Mill agrees to deduct
228 Western Machine Tool Works and International Association of Machinists
(AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 11 (Jan. 21, 1942).22  Bendix Products Division of Bendix Aviation Corporatiofi and United
Automobile Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 2 (Jan. 14,
1942).
.22 Robert Jacobs Shipyards and International Brotherhood of Carpenters
(AFL), Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers (CIO), National
War Labor Board case No. 4 (Jan. 14, 1942).
2269 LAn. REL. REP. 637 (Feb. 9, 1942).
227 Marshall Field (Spray, N. C.) and Textile Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 10 (Jan. 15, 1942).
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from the weekly earnings Union dues in the amount of 25c per week,
to be paid to the Union.
'2 2
8
In response to a request by the company, the Board officially ap-
proved this agreement on March 5, in a regular directive order.2 29
The first clear-cut decision of the War Labor Board on the union
security issue and the first Board order granting maintenance of mem-
bership came in the Walker-Turner Company case.230  During the
course of this protracted dispute many of the members had dropped
out of the union. Consequently, the Board granted retroactive main-
tenance of membership, providing that all employees "who are now or
who on November 27, 1941 were or since have been members" must
remain members as a condition of employment. The maintenance of
membership provision was not as strict as some, because in case a
member lost his good standing he was not automatically discharged as
is usually provided. Instead, the grievance arbitrator could either
direct the company to discharge the employee, or "direct the Company
to deduct from the first pay period of each month during the term of
this contract and pay to the Union a sum equivalent to the employee's
dues and also, if any fine is imposed upon the employee, a sum equiv-
alent to that fine, and the employee shall be deprived of his seniority
rights. ... 231
The public members of the Board justified the decision on these
grounds: The employer had shown by his actions that he intended to
go no farther than the law required in dealing with the union. The
employer had invested in new equipment to such an extent that he
could not afford to pay more than substandard wages; thus, the union
was at a disadvantage in winning membership. The union's constitu-
tion was democratic, members being protected in their rights by hear-
ings and review of charges. Dues were moderate, and the order
required that no new assessments be made other than those required by
the national union. The majority opinion rejected the recommendation
of the minority member of the panel that the maintenance of member-
ship requirement apply only to those employees who signed authoriza-
tion cards, as in the Marshall Field case. The reason given for not
doing this was that:
"... such a requirement would defeat the very end for which a
clause was inserted. Here we have a situation in which a Union which
refrained from striking has already begun to disintegrate. They have
been unable through no fault of their own to get for their membership
228 9 LAB. REL. REP. 638 (Feb. 9, 1942).
220 Id. at 694 (Feb. 22, 1942).
2 8 Walker-Turner Company and United Electrical and Radio Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 17 (Jan. 27, 1942).231 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, April 10, 1942.
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a wage to which that membership not without reason feels entitled.
To require the Union now to recanvass the membership in the light of
these circumstances would merely accelerate the forces of isintegra-
tion already in operation. The result might well be no more than an
expression of resentment against the wage provisions of the contract,
which the negotiating agents of the union have been obliged to
accept .... "232
The labor members of the Board wrote a concurring opinion in
which they said that they were "dissatisfied with certain aspects of
the decision," but concurred because it made "a considerable approach
to an adequate solution."2-3 They felt that a stronger union security
clause should have been granted, and objected to limitation placed on
the union as to the amount of its dues.
The dissenting opinion of the employer members was a typical state-
ment of the employer attitude toward the granting of union maintenance
by a government agency. The opinion, written by Roger D. Lapham,
said in part:
"2 .... the Board refuses to give any union employee an oppor-
tunity to say whether his obligation to maintain union membership
meets his approval or not.
3. . . It is said that anti-union bias exists here which distin-
guishes it from other cases and justifies the unusual treatment ...
This Board should be governed by an-underlying rule of reason dis-
regarding the individual characteristics of the disputants. It should
not make final determinations based on whether an employer or a
union is goo'd, bad or indifferent.
5. ... When these employees joined the union, they did not agree
to forfeit their jobs or their seniority rights if they exercised their
right to withdraw from the union. In any organization governed
by democratic principles, its members retain the right to be heard
in opposition to policies and to resign at will. Why should the mem-
bers of labor unions be denied these rights?
. . . We are convinced that persuasion, rather than compulsion,
produces the best results and that within the framew6rk of law we
should leave it to management and the representatives of the workers
to solve the difficult problem of union status. In this case the Board
has substituted for voluntary agreement of the parties its directive
order imposing on many employees union membership as one of the
conditions of employment. This, we believe, is not a power which
this Board should attempt to exercise.
7. . . . To the extent that management is circumscribed by tle
orders of an administrative board transferring to labor organizations
even partial control of terms of employment and hiring of workers,
production will be hampered.
8. Before this war is over, every individual and every group
will have to make sacrifices and accept restrictions not now dreamed
of. The effect of the directive order supports the view that organ-
[Vol. 21
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ized labor, having agreed not to strike while the war lasts, should
not be refused concessions which might have been obtained by eco-
nomic force in peace time. If this should happen, then labor, in giv-
ing up the right to strike, would actually be surrendering nothing."3 4
We have observed that in the Marshall Field case the Board placed
its approval on a voluntary agreement which made maintenance of
membership dependent upon written acceptance by the individual em-
ployee. In the International Harvester cases, 35 decided on April 15,
the Board again applied the principle of voluntary acceptance, but this
time on a collective basis. The order directed that the maintenance of
membership clause should not apply until:
"... the National War Labor Board has certified to the company in
writing that a. majority of the members of the local union who are
employees of the company have voted affirmatively on this specific issue
by secret ballot in a referendum conducted under the auspices of the
Board subsequent to the signing of this contract."' 36
In explaining this action, the majority stated:
"When a union security program is indicated as desirable, recourse
should be had to the principle of voluntary acceptance by those em-
ployees who belong to the union. Various procedures may be adopted
to effectuate this principle in the light of the facts of the individual
cases. In the present case, the democratic principle of majority rule
has been adopted as the most equitable application of the principle of
voluntary acceptance."' '
7
Again Roger D. Lapham wrote the dissenting opinion of the em-
ployer members. They objected to the order because it did not preserve
the right of the union members to individual choice, and suggested
instead the Marshall Field formula providing for individual acceptance
of the maintenance of membership. The employer members indicated
that they would have been willing to approve the maintenance clause
provided the employees were given ten days in which to make up their
minds whether they wished to get in or stay out of the union.38 This
technique of a fixed "escape period," first suggested by public member
Wayne L. Morse but rejected by the Board in this case, was later
adopted as a part of the "standard" clause and applied in numerous
cases.
As a result of this decision, elections were held in eight International
Ibid.
International Harvester Company and Farm Equipment Workers Organiz-
ing Committee (CIO), and United Automobile Workers (CIO), National War
Labor Board cases No. N. D. M. B. 4, N. D. M. B. 4-A, and N. D. M. B. 89
consolidated for consideration by National War Labor Board (Jan. 14, 1942).
"' National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, April 15, 1942.
23 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
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Harvester plants, and in all of them a majority of the union members
voted in favor of adoption of the maintenance of membership provision.
It has been noted above that the recommendation of the Defense
Mediation Board for maintenance of membership in the Federal Ship-
building and Drydock case239 was refused by the company, which pre-
ferred to let the Navy take over the plant rather than comply with the
recommendation. 240 The plant was returned to the owners early in
1942, at which time the case was referred to the War Labor Board to
determine once again the union security issue. On April 24, the War
Labor Board issued its directive order, which supported the decision of
the Mediation Board by again ordering 'maintenance of membership.
The order provided that members who lost their good standing could
retain their jobs by having regular union 'dues deducted from their pay
for the duration of the contract.
241
The decision was strongly defended in a majority opinion written
by Dr. Frank Graham, and in a concurring opinion by Chairman Davis,
in which they made it plain that the Board did not intend to stand for
any more opposition from the company. Dr. Graham said in part:
"This case came to the National War Labor Board because of the
long defiance of the Government of the United States by the Federal
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the
United States Steel Corporation. It is high time that in the midst of
a world war involving the future of America and the future of freedom,
that a dispute in a plant building most essential ships for America and
for freedom be settled without further delay."
242
Dr. Graham defended the decision on several points. First of all,
the clause did not require any worker at any time to join the union.
An escape period was not necessary, he said, because the employees
had known for several months that a maintenance of membership con-
tract might be signed and could have withdrawn from the union during
that period. Mr. Davis answered the arguments which had been given
by the company to the effect that a maintenance of membership clause
was illegal under the Wagner Act. He pointed out, reasonably enough,
that Section 8(3) of the act which legalized closed shop contracts must
be interpreted also to legalize more moderate union security contracts
such as maintenance of membership.
2 43
The employer members again 'dissented, asking that the order pro-
vide either for individual written acceptance of the maintenance of
Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company and Industrial Union of Marine
and Shipbuilding Workers of America (CIO), National War Labor Board case
No. N. D. M. B. 46 (Jan. 14, 1942).
... See supra p. 153.
National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, April 25, 1942.
262 Ibid.
2349 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §158 (1940).
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membership, or that an escape period be provided during which mem-
bers could withdraw from the union before the maintenance clause went
into effect. Employer member E. J. McMillan, in a separate dissenting
opinion, made the point that "... if labor demands of an agency of the
Federal Government the imposition of union security upon its members
*. . then should not the government prescribe the rules governing thq
operation of that union and the disposition of its funds?"244
The executives of the company -did not choose to resist the govern-
ment a second time, although they still maintained that the maintenance
of membership clause was unjustified and illegal. President Korndorff
wrote a letter to Chairman Davis in which he said: "Though insisting
that the law-making power is vested exclusively in the Congress, the
Company does feel bound, in this critical hour, to recognize the Board's
authority as an umpire finally to settle disputes within the law. 245
Federal Shipbuilding was the last case in which a Board order
applied the maintenance of membership requirements to employees who
had 'during a specified period in the past been members of the union
but who had since resigned, and the only case in which members were
allowed to withdraw from the union by continuing to pay dues. The
first week in June, four more maintenance of membership orders were
issued, all of them applying to employees who were members of the
union at the date of the agreement or who later joined. These orders
settled the Robins Dry Dock case,2 46 the Brown and Sharpe case,
247
the Nevada Consolidated Copper case,248 and the case of the Hotel
Employers' Association of San Francisco.
2 49
In Robins Dry Dock the panel said that no escape provision was
necessary since the employees had been notified several months before
that the union was demanding a union shop, and the members knew,
therefore, that maintenance of membership might become a condition
of employment.
250
The order in the Brown and Sharpe case was justified by the Board
on the grounds of the employer's record of 'opposition to the union.
The union's request that the maintenance of membership clause also
include those who had merely made application for membership was
refused.
251
' National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, April 25, 1942.
", National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, May 8, 1942.
248 Robins Dry Dock and Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Work-
ers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. N. D. M. B. 97 (Jan. 14, 1942).
2' Brown and Sharpe Manufacturing Company and International Association
of Machinists (AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 101 (April 4, 1942).
248 Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation and Metal Trades Department
(AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 99 (April 3, 1942).2,4 Hotel Employers' Association and Hotel and Restaurant Employees (AFL),
National War Labor Board case No. 21 (Jan. 30, 1942).
"'National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 2, 1942.
2I National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 3, 1942.
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In the Nevada Consolidated Copper case the Board said the union
was entitled to maintenance of membership because its organizational
efforts had extended over a long period of time, and because it was
unfair for members to benefit from the union's first agreement and
then resign.
2 52
In the Hotel Employers' Association case the union complained that
a previous agreement for preferential, hiring had not actually operated
to give union members preference. The Board strengthened the prefer-
ential hiring clause, and supported it with maintenance of membership
and grievance provisions.
253
We have seen above in the International Harvester cases and the
Federal Shipbuilding case that the employer members objected that no
provision was made for individual acceptance of the maintenance of
membership provision, and advocated an "escape period" during. which
employees could join or resign from the union. This demand of the
employer members was first complied with in the Ryan Aeronautical
order,254 voted by the Board on June 11, and subsequently ordered in
twenty-three cases as part of the so-called "standard" clause. As a
result of this concession to the employer members, their unanimous
opposition to maintenance of membership was broken down for the first
time. In the Ryani decision the vote was ten to two, with only two
employer members dissenting. On the next day a similar clause in the
Ranger Aircraft case255 was likewise voted ten to two. The E-Z Mills
decision 56 was passed eight to one, with two employer members con-
curring and only one dissenting, this being the first time that a majority
of the employer members voted for maintenance of membership.
The maintenance of membership provision in the Ryan case, which
came to be known as a "stan-dard" maintenance of membership, was
copied word for word in the Ranger and E-Z Mills decisions and in
most of the subsequent Board orders granting maintenance of member-
ship. It read:
"All employees who, 15 days after the date of the Directive Order of
the National War Labor Board in this case, are mntebers of the Union
in good standing in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the
Union, and those employees who may thereafter become members shall,
as a condition of employment, remain members of the Union in good
standing during the life of the agreement.
The Union shall promptly furnish to the National War Labor Board
25 10 LAB. REL. REP. 484 (June 8, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 4, 1942.
"' Ryan Aeronautical Company and United Automobile Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 46 (Feb. 14, 1942).
"I Ranger Engineering Corporation and United Automobile Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 24 (Feb. 5, 1942).
2" 8E-Z Mills and International Ladies Garment Workers (AFL), National
War Labor Board case No. 55 (Feb. 20, 1942).
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a notarized list of members in good standing 15 days after the date of
the Directive Order. If any employee named on the list asserts that
he withdrew from membership in the Union prior to that date, the
assertion or dispute shall be adjudicated by an arbiter appointed by
the National War Labor Board whose decision shall be final and bind-
ing upon the Union and the employee."
257
Roger D. Lapham wrote a concurring opinion in the Ryan case
explaining his vote for union maintenance in the three cases. He said
in part:
"While in the present case, as well as in many others, the necessity
of a union maintenance clause is not apparent, I have voted with the
public and labor members because they have met a main objection to
any union maintenance of membership clause.
However ... this' Board ... should avoid compelling an employer
to .discharge a competent employee merely because he chooses not to
continue his union membership .... In the Federal Shipyard case the
Directive Order provided: 'If through this process such employee is
declared not to be in good standing the arbiter shall discharge the
employee unless as a conditiofi of continued employment the employee
agrees to request the company, in writing, to deduct from his pay his
financial obligations to the union.' It seems inconsistent not to include
some such provision in any union maintenance clause prescribed by this
Board.
• . .To date, labor is unwilling to accept such simple, statutory
requirements providing for registration of unions, filing of union con-
stitution and by-laws and filing of audited sworn statements of receipts
and expenditures. If by governmental order we are going to. impose
any form of employer-employee relationship, it follows that ample pro-
tection in some way should be accorded union members against the
improper acts of union officers, just as stockholders are protected
against improper acts of their officers and directors. 2 58
Employer member E. J. McMillan expressed in general the same
position in his opinion, except that he thought these objections war-
ranted a dissenting vote.259
A unanimous decision on maintenance of membership finally came
on June 24 in the Phelps-Dodge cases28 0 when all six of the members
sitting on the Board approved a clause identical with that in the Ryan
case. George H. Mead and Richard Deupree were the employer mem-
bers voting.
2 1'
This happy unanimity was not to last long, however. Only a few
"' National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 18, 1942.
'-"Ibid. 2- Ibid.
Phelps-Dodge Corporation (6 plants) and Metal Trades Department
(AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 114 (April 6, 1942); Phelps-Dodge
Corporation and International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 5 (Jan. 14, 1942).201 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 26, 1942.
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days later in the Caterpillar Tractor case 212 the vote was again eight to
four, all four employer members objecting to the inclusion of the same
standard clause they had agreed to in the Phelps-Dodge cases. Roger
D. Lapham wrote the dissenting opinion in which he attempted to
justify this reversal of position by the employer members. He charged
that the Board was adopting a fixed policy of granting maintenance of
membership wherever union security was demanded, whether or not
the facts showed that such union security was needed. He stated that
in this case no more than a promise of recognition and cooperation was
needed, because the company had not engaged in unfair labor practices,
this was the union's first contract, and in a recently conducted N.L.R.B.
election the union had just barely won over a rival union. Further-
more, Mr. Lapham suggested that unions given maintenance of mem-
bership be asked to meet the requirements of the proposed Vinson
Bill.263  Specifically, he would have required the union to furnish a
copy of its constitution and by-laws, names of its officers, amount of
dues and initiation, and a statement of receipts and expenditures. He
said:
"Inasmuch as this Board has now established what appears to be a
fixed policy under which-it shall be giving some form of maintenance
of union membership in any dispute where union security is asked, it
seems only fair and reasonable to require that the unions receiving this
advantage measure up to certain standards. If a government agency
is to give advantages not granted by legislative action, it should also
impose upon the beneficiary certain conditions which Congress has not
yet seen fit.to require."20 4
These arguments were met by public member Wayne L. Morse in a
special concurring opinion. In it he traced the steps in the search by
the public members of the Board for a compromise between the demands
of the labor members for an all-union shop on the one hand, and the
insistence by the employer members on the other hand that union secu-
rity should not even be considered by the Board. He pointed out that
the labor members had "modified materially their original position," and
that the employer members had shown a-similar willingness to compro-
mise in the Ryan, Ranger, E-Z Mills, and Phelps-Dodge cases. Now,
he said, the employer members were retracting their former compro-
mises and were demanding more concessions from the other side. In
the International Harvester cases the employer members had opposed
maintenance of membership on collective approval, but had indicated
that they would be willing to grant maintenance of membership when
202 Caterpillar Tractor Company and Farm Equipment Workers Organizing
Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 63 (March 3, 1942).
11* H. R. 6444, 88 CoNG. REc. 585 (1942).
"' National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 5, 1942.
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modified by an escape period. The public members, influenced by the
desire for unanimous 'decisions, had in the Ryan case given in to the
employer members and agreed to a fifteen-day escape period, and some
of the employer members had approved the clause. Finally, on June
24, all of the employer members voting had approved such a clause.
He continued:
"What happened ... to cause the employer members of the Board
to adopt such a great change in their position on the union maintenance
issue? When the instant case involving the Caterpillar Tractor Com-
pany was presented for consideration of the Board on July 1, it was a
great surprise to the public members to discover that the employer
members would not approve the same escape clause formula which they
bad voted for unanimously in the Phelps-Dodge case of June 24,
1942.11265
Mr. Morse pointed out that the situation had been almost identical
in the International Harvester case as in the Caterpillar Tractor case.
In both instances it was the first union contract, the union had won an
N.L.R.B. election by only a slight margin, and, contrary to the assertion
of Mr. Lapham, the management of the Caterpillar Company had also
in effect hindered the union. Yet in the International Harvester case
the employer members had indicated that they would accept the same
kind of maintenance clause which they now refused. Coming next to
Mr. Lapham's suggestion that the Board enforce certain objectives of
the Vinson Bill, Mr. Morse called it "asking the War Labor Board to
legislate certain regulations upon unions which Congress failed to do."
Mr. Morse stated that he was in favor of Congress subjecting labor
unions to greater government regulation, but that:
". .. it would be equally absurd to suggest that the War Labor
Board should go into the financial practices and policies of employers
and employer associations and police the same, as it would that they
should follow such a course in connection with union finances. That is
not what the War Labor Board was set up to do." 266
Mr. Morse also denied the contention of Mr. Lapham that the
Board had adopted a policy of granting maintenance of membership
whenever union security was demanded. He pointed out that a large
proportion of the cases 'coming before the Board called for some kind
of union security because the Board handled only those cases which
could not be settled by negotiation, and those cases were usually the
ones where anti-union activities by the employer had created ill feeling.
Finally Mr. Morse said:
"It is to be hoped that the position which the employers have taken
in the instant case will not control their future stand on this issue of
20t; Ibid. 2 Ibid.
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union security .... Of course, if American employers are going to
open anew their attack on some reasonable form of union maintenance
as the escape clause plan proposed in this case and voted for by the
employer members voting in the Phelps-Dodge case and by at least
two of their members in several other cases, then they must be willing
to assume their full share of the responsibility for the industrial strife
that may result therefrom.
'26 7
Perhaps in no case did the Board face such aggressive opposition
from employers as it did in the "Little Steel" cases involving the Bethle-
hem Steel,288 Republic Steel,209 Youngstown Sheet and Tube,270 and
Inland Steel companies271 As early as February, five months before
the cases were decided, a public statement had been issued by Bethle-
hem and Republic in which they called the maintenance of membership
clause in the Marshall Field case a "camouflaged closed shop," and
said they had been unable to find any steel company which would
accept it.272 Inland Steel contended that the Board did not have author-
ity to consider the union shop question, following which the Board
unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that it had been directed
to settle all disputes and intended to do so.2 7 8  Labor leaders accused
the employers of trying to* run out on the agreement made by the
Industry-Labor Conference, whereupon W. P. Witherow, president of
the National Association of Manufacturers and a member of the con-
ference, replied that the employer members of the conference had always
said that the Board should not consider union security.2 7 4 The Board
issued a counter reply, with the endorsement of the employer members,
in which it reiterated its stand, saying in part:
"At the conclusion of the conference, both industry and labor com-
mitted themselves to the peaceful settlement of all disputes by a War
Labor Board to be established by the President.
•... In such consideration (of the union security issue), each mem-
ber of the Board reserves the right, of course, to vote upon the merits
of the particular cases according to his convictions.
'27
When the fact-finding panel issued its report on all four cases,
in which it recommended maintenance of membership and a check-off,
21- Ibid.
2" Bethlehem Steel Corporation (14 plants) and Steel Workers Organizing
Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 30 (Feb. 6, 1942).
"' Republic Steel Corporation and Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 31 (Feb. 7, 1942).
2. Youngstovn Sheet and Tube Company and Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 34 (Feb. 10, 1942).
" Inland Steel Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 35 (Feb. 10, 1942).
29 LAB. RmL. REP. 694 (Feb. 23, 1942).
'7 10 LAB. REL. REP. 113 (March 23, 1942).
I, d. at 289 (April 27, 1942). '" Id. at 290.
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Inland Steel again questioned the Board's afithority and insisted that
union security was not warranted in this case.276 When the Board
issued its order on July 16 accepting the panel recommendation, the
other "Little Steel" companies accepted, with objections, while Inland
Steel requested that time be given to permit it "to secure a determina-
tion from the federal courts as to whether the Board's directive order on
union security is beyond the power conferred by the President. ' '277 The
Board again made a unanimous stand in refusing to withhold its deci-
sion pending litigation. Bethlehem and Republic both accepted the
order, but stated that they were doing so only because the country was
at war.
278
In spite of this opposition the Board's order granted a standard
maintenance clause plus a check-off for union members. All four
employer members dissented. Once more they charged that the public
members had adopted a fixed policy of granting maintenance whenever
union security was demanded:
"... the public members of the Board have always found justification
for ordering maintenance of membership. In the case before us the
majority opinion is predicated on the fact that the union is well estab-
lished and responsible. Yet in the Ranger Aircraft case the need for
security by the union was based on its loss of members, and in the
Caterpillar Tractor case the majority opinion, which implied a recog-
nition of the present lack of responsibility on the part of the union,
stated 'this maintenance of a stable union membership makes for the
maintenance of a responsible union leadership. . .'. The record clearly
indicates that the concern of the public members of the Board has
been for the formula by which maintenance of membership is to be
required rather than for the question of whether union security should
be granted in any case.
... the employer members are unalterably opposed to the Board's
.present trend toward the application of this or any other formula as a
concessions to unions in all or most cases coming before it.
'2 79
Furthermore, the employer members repeated their request that
union§, when granted maintenance by the Board, be required to file with
the Board a copy of the constitution, by-laws, names of officers, amount
of dues and initiation fees, and a semi-annual financial report-all of
which should become public records. In addition they would have
required the union to pledge that it would not make contributions to
any political party or candidate during the life of the contract.
280
In a separate statement Roger D. Lapham said in part:
"Labor leaders still demand privileges and favors because they have
given up the right to strike. This is plain bunk, with a capital 'B.'
' Id. at 595 (July 6, 1942).
' Id. at 713 (July 27, 1942). , Ibid.
"'2 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 16, 1942.
280 Ibid.
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What citizen has a right to strike in a war for his country's existence?
Yet stoppages and slow-downs appear to be on the increase and .. .
production is down or curtailed because so far the top-side leaders of
labor have forgotten the pledge given at the management-labor con-
ference last December .... ,,281
The decision in the "Little Steel" cases became the basis of settle-
ment not only in the four steel companies immediately involved, but
was also applied by the Board in the Colorado Fuel and Iron case 282
and in the case involving Five Subsidiaries of United States Steel,28a
both of which cases are discussed below.
Whether or not the majority of the Board had adopted a fixed
policy of granting maintenance of membership whenever union security
was demanded, it does appear that they had adopted what was almost
a fixed idea as to the form that maintenance of membership clauses
should take. This is indicatedby the fact that between June 11, 1942,
when the "standard" clause was first used in the Ryan case, and Sep-
tember 1, 1942, when this study ends, a total of twenty-seven main-
tenance of membership clauses were ordered, and all but four of them
were "standard" clauses. In most of these the employer members
registered dissenting votes.
The dispute at J I. Case Company28 4 was settled on July 22, by a
Board order granting standard maintenance of membership, with all
employer members dissenting. The Board adopted the panel recom-
mendation, which justified the maintenance of membership on the
grounds of a long and bitter strike history, and because it would pro-
mote harmonious relations and strengthen the war effort.
2 5
In the United States Rubber Company case280 the Board adopted
the panel recommendation for a standard maintenance clause. The
panel said that the company could not object in principle because it
had a maintenance clause in one plant and the union shop in others.
The union was admittedly responsible, and had conducted only one
plant strike in the preceding five years. The maintenance clause was
needed because of the disrupting effects of plant conversion, and be-
281 Ibid.
... Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation and International Union of Mine, Mill
and Smelter Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 51 (Feb. 19,
1942).
28 United States Steel Corporation (five subsidiaries: Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corporation, Columbia Steel Company, American Steel and Wire Company,
National Tube Company, Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company) and
United Steelworkers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 364 (Aug. 12,
1942).
2 8J. I. Case Company and United Automobile Workers (CIO), National
War Labor Board case No. 130 (April 28, 1942).28510 LA. REs.. REP. 721-722 (July 27, 1942).
288United States Rubber Company and United Rubber Workers (CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. 180 (May 28, 1942).
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cause the union members were dissatisfied over the wage situation.
The employer member of the panel argued that no additional union
security was necessary because the company and the union had "co-
operated so fully and fairly."28 7
The existence of anti-Negro and anti-union feeling in a Southern
city was cited as justification for granting union maintenance and a
check-off in the case of the Buckeye Cotton Oil Company. 8 8  The
majority of the panel said:
".... this union, composed mostly of Negroes, who work in a South-
ern plant, owned and supervised by white men, requires the security
and prestige which comes with a maintenance of membership clause.
The record also clearly'indicates that certain business elements, local
governmental officials, and the press in Memphis are hostile toward
unions and towards the CIO in particular. Finally, the general atti-
tude toward Negroes in Memphis, as in all the South, is inimical to any
organization which seeks to grant Negroes any kind of economic
equality with white men." 28 9
The vote by the Board was four to two, employer members
dissenting.
Beginning in August the Board again reached full agreement in a
series of orders granting maintenance of membership. In the S. A.
Woods Machine Company case2 90 and the Borg-Warner Corporation
case, 2 9 1 both decided on August 1, the employer members continued to
voice their objections to maintenance of membership, but voted affirm-
atively nevertheless. In explaining their position they said:
"When it came to a vote on this (S. A. Woods Machine Company)
case, in which the three members of the mediation panel had unan-
imously recommended a maintenance of membership clause, the em-
ployer Board members were faced with a choice of two alternatives.
One was to continue to vote against granting maintenance of member-
ship except in such cases where circumstances very clearly justified it
as a means of securing uninterrupted 'war production. The other was
to assent on the grounds that nothing constructive could be gained by
continually voting no as a matter of principle.
The latter course was chosen in the belief that constant emphasis
on disagreement could serve no useful purpose in this critical period.
However, the employer members wish to make plain that they
reserve their rights to reverse or revise their position on the question
2 87 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 23, 1942.
288 Buckeye Cotton Oil Company and United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing,
and Allied Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 59 (Feb. 27,
1942).
280 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 31, 1942.
210S. A. Woods Machine Company and United Electrical Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 160 (May 15, 1942).
201 Borg-Warner Corporation and United Automobile Workers (CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. 135 (April 30, 1942).
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of maintenance of membership at any time and in any case coming
before the Board, particularly when they think because of some special
facts the public interest would not be served by granting maintenance
of membership."1
292
The company, however, showed no such conciliatory spirit, but
opposed union security to the end. Following the course taken by
Inland Steel, it requested that the Board grant time to test the decision
in the courts. The Board refused, insisting again that it was author-
ized to make final determination of union security disputes, and calling
upon the employer to accept the decision as others had done. To this
the company replied:
"We regret that you are disposed to deny us a court trial of your
powers. Neither union maintenance nor compulsory arbitration has
anything to do with production in our plant....
There is no reason why we should be called upon to surrender the
rights of American citizens in order to resolve the dilemma which
advantages [sic] out of the national peril.
'293
On receipt of this reply, the Board wrote a letter to President
Roosevelt in which it referred the case to him for such action as he
deemed appropriate. The following day the President issued an
executive order authorizing confiscation of the plant by the Secretary
of War.
In its next two maintenance orders the Board departed from the
standard form of clause, but only because of special circumstances. In
a case where there was formerly a union shop, the Board nevertheless
refused to make such a requirement in, its directive order, but instead
granted maintenance of membership,, without an escape clause, and
preferential hiring.- This was in the Realty Advisory Board case,204
involving a master contract among building service employees in New
York City. The decision was justified by, the Board because of rival
union activities and on the grounds that the union leaders needed help
in their job of administering a difficult contract under which numerous
grievances were bound "to arise. The preferential hiring clause pro-
vided that when a union member left a job he must be replaced by a
union member. The maintenance of membership provision did not
allow a fifteen-day escape period,, but became effective on the signing
of the contract.29 5
In a directive order on August 5, involving the Coos Bay Logging
Company, the CoosEgay Lumber Company and the Port Orford Cedar
' National War Labor Board- Unpublished- Release, Aug. 1, 1942.
10 LAD. REL. REi'. 854 (Aug. 24, 1942).2 ,Realty Advisory Board of New York City and Building Service Employees
(AFL) National War Labor Board case No. 141 (May 1. 1942).
16 LAB. REL Rix. 790-793 (Aug. 10, 1942).
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Company29 6 the Board ordered the adoption of the same maintenance
clause which the Defense Mediation Board had recommended, in which
the maintenance provision applied to all members at the time of the
contract. The panel frankly stated that it would have ordered a stand-
ard clause except that the other kind of clause was already in effect
in a large part of the West Coast lumber industry and to "introduce a
maintenance of membership formula at variance with the formula now
predominating in the industry would tend to promote discord .... 297
The vote in this case was eight to one, with H. B. Horton, employer
member, dissenting.
On August 6, the Board unanimously accepted the recommendation
of the panel for standard maintenance of membership in the Consol-
idated Steel case. 298 The majority of the panel had said that such
security was needed by the union because: The company was located
in an anti-union area; the steel industry was traditionally open-shop;
the company had shown an anti-union bias; the company had a closed
shop and various other union security agreements at other plants; the
union had demonstrated responsibility, and the union leaders were
having trouble because of the rapid expansion in personnel.
299
On August 13 the Board ordered the adoption of a standard main-
tenance of membership contract in the Crittall Federal cases00 with
employer member Horton casting the lone dissenting vote.301
In the Bemis Brothers Bag Company case,302 decided on August
15, the Board unanimously approved and made its directive order the
agreement which the two parties had concluded, providing among other
things a standard maintenance clause. The company asked the Board
for a directive order because, according to the panel, it wanted protec-
tion against any employees' suits which might arise out of the enforce-
ment of the maintenance clause.3 0 3
The Board issued a joint order settling the American Aluminum
Company case3 4 and the American Magnesium Company case 05
28Coos Bay Logging Company and International Woodworkers (CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. 157 (May 15, 1942); Coos Bay Lumber Com-
pany and International Woodworkers (CIO), National War Labor Board case
No. 156 (May 15, 1942); Port Orford Cedar Company and International Wood-
workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 155 (May 15, 1942).
"110 LAB. REL. REP. 799 (Aug. 10, 1942).
28 Consolidated Steel Corporation and Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 43 (Feb. 13, 1942).
National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 6, 1942.
0o Crittall Federal Sash Company and Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental
Iron Workers (AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 164 (May 19, 1942).
'"1 10 LAB. REL. REP. 861 (Aug. 24, 1942).
101Bemis Brothers Bag Company and Textile Workers Union (CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. 262 (July 8, 1942).
'"3 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 18, 1942.
" Aluminum Company of America (8 plants) and Aluminum Workers of
America (CIO), United Automobile Workers (CIO)" and National Assembly of
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granting a standard maintenance clause, with Horace B. Horton again
registering the only dissenting vote. The Board order denied the main-
tenance clause to the Cleveland plant of the Aluminum Company until
a representative of the Board could study the "unsatisfactory relations
of the Company and the Union" at that plant. This part of the Board's
order was criticized by the two CIO members of the Board, who con-
tended that union security was needed at the Cleveland plant no matter
what the investigation might disclose. They pointed out that in the
"Little Steel" decision the opinion on union security had said that main-
tenance of membership would help to discipline irresponsible members
or help to oust unworthy leaders. In view of this previous stand of the
Board, they said, to make the grant of union security at the Cleveland
plant dependent upon an investigation was inconsistent 300
In the Norma-Hoffman Bearings case,107 decided on August 24, the
Board ordered a standard maintenance clause but refused the check-off
as unnecessary. The labor members dissented without opinion, but
apparently they objected only to the wage decision and the refusal of
the check-off.808
In deciding the dispute involving Five Subsidiaries of the United
States Steel Corporation,3 0 9 the Board on August 26 issued an order
containing the same maintenance of membership and check-off provisions
which it had ordered in the "Little Steel" cases. The four employer
members dissented, claiming that the Board had considered this case
identical with the "Little Steel" cases, when in fact there were impor-
tant differences. They argued that no -such union security was needed
because the companies had not opposed the union but had a record of
complete acceptance of the union.310
The last maintenance of membership granted by the Board which is
included within the scope of this thesis was given in the Pioneer Gen-E
Motor Company case311 on August 31. The company had operated
under a closed shop contract with an AFL union for three years, until
the rival CIO union won an election in which 567 out of 600 employees
Die Casting Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 64 (March 2,
1942).3o0 American Magnesium Company and District 50 United Mine Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 33 (Feb. 10, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 20, 1942.
'°TNorma-Hoffman Bearings Corporation and United Electrical Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 120 (April 24, 1942).
'0" National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 24, 1942.
3.. United States Steel Corporation (five subsidairies: Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corporation, Columbia Steel Company, American Steel and Wire Company, Na-
tional Tube Company, Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company) and United
Steelworkers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 364 (Aug. 12, 1942).
810 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 26, 1942.
"I Pioneer Gen-E Motor Company and United Electrical Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 220 (June 18, 1942).
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voted in its favor. In spite of this past record the company said it
opposed the CIO's union shop demand on the basis of principle. The
panel unanimously recommended a straight maintenance of membership
clause because it said that "there is no occasion for an escape clause."
The Board, however, ordered the standard form of clause with the
fifteen-day escape period, to which the labor members dissented.
12
Although the charge was made from time to time that the Board
had adopted a policy of granting maintenance of membership whenever
union security was demanded, the Board in several cases specifically
refused to grant maintenance clauses.
In the Arcade Malleable Iron case,313 decided on May 1, the Board
said that the union did not need either a union shop or maintenance of
membership because there was no competing labor organization, the
union already had a substantial number of the employees, and the con-
tract was the first one signed with the company. The Board did grant,
however, a voluntary, revocable check-off.3 14
The Board order in the Armour Leather case3 15 denied a union shop
and maintenance of membership on the grounds that the union had a
large proportion of the employees and was still growing, none of the
plants in that area had any kind of union shop contract, and the parties
needed more experience in dealing with each other. Instead the Board
ordered a voluntary, revocable check-off and a promise by the company
not to discriminate.
3 16
On June 25, immediately following four cases in which the Board
had ordered standard maintenance clauses, the Board adopted the panel
recommendation in the American Brass Company case3 17 denying any
form of union security except a check-off. The panel said that no
security was needed because the parties had shown an ability to settle
their disagreements and had a common pride in their contribution to
the war effort. One labor member of the Board dissented.
318
As late as August 27, 1942, the Board refused to grant maintenance
of membership in the Monsanto Chemical Company and New England
Alcohol Company case.319 No form ofunion security was granted be-
" National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 31, 1942.... Arcade and Malleable Iron Works and Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. N. D. M. B. 84 (Jan. 14,
1942).
""4 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, May 1, 1942.
"' Armour Leather Company and International Union of Fur and Leather
Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 98 (April 3, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 10, 1942.
"' American Brass Company and Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 131 (April 29, 1942).National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 25, 1942.
Monsanto Chemical Company, New England Alcohol Company and Chem-
ical Workers Federal Labor Union (AFL), National War Labor Board case
No. 292 (July 20, 1942).
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cause the union had violated its no-strike pledge by calling a five-day
strike during July. The Board opinion said "... the granting of union
security to this union must at least be postponed until such time as
this union demonstrates that it has adopted a change of attitude in
regard to the use of the strike weapon during the period of this war.' 3 20
During the period between January 13 and September 1, 1942, a
total of seventeen War Labor Board cases were settled by voluntary
agreements providing some form of maintenance of membership. Some
of these settlements indicate a considerable amount of Board influence,
while others appear to have been arrived at independently. Just as with
the Board orders, these maintenance of membership agreements fol-
lowed "three main formulas: straight maintenance clauses applying to all
who were members on the date of the contract or who joined later;
"Marshall Field" clauses applying only to those employees who volun-
tarily agreed to maintain membership; and "standard" clauses provid-
ing an escape period during which members could withdraw from the
union.
Six of the seventeen maintenance of membership agreements were
of the straight, unqualified type with no escape provisions. The first
three agreements followed this formula, and have been noted above in
the Western Machine Tool, Bendix Aviation, and Robert Jacobs Ship-
yard cases.
The Roller Bearing Company3 2 1 agreement provided that members
of the union who with-drew or became delinquent in their dues would
have to continue their dues payments unless they could show adequate
reason for the delinquency or resignation. The adequacy of the reason
was to be determined by a management-union committee, or if they
failed to agree, by an arbitrator.8
2 2
In the Maryland Drydock 23 agreement the union was asked to sup-
ply the company with a list of its membership as of the -date when the
contract was signed, and all employees on the list were required to
remain in good standing. If any employee objected to the inclusion of
his name on the list, the controversy was submitted to an arbitrator.8 24
The Marshall Field agreement and five other agreements provided
that the maintenance of membership requirement would apply only to
those employees who voluntarily certified in writing that they were
willing to have the clause apply to them. These agreements settled
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 27, 1942.
" Roller Bearing Company of America and United Automobile Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 93 (March 31, 1942).
10 LAB. RE.. R P. 319 (May 4, 1942).
8" Maryland Drydock Company and Industrial Union of Marine and Ship-
building Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 79 (March 17,
1942).
11"10 LAB. REL. REP. 566 (June 22, 1942).
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the disputes at Connor Lumber and Land Company, 25 Columbus and
Southern Ohio Electric Company,3 26 Westinghouse Air Brake Com-
pany,, 27 Singer Manufacturing Company,328 and J. D. Adams Man-
ufacturing Company.
3 29
It was noted above that the first time the Board ordered the stand-
ard type of maintenance of membership was in the Ryan case on June
11. This formula was first used in an agreement a few days later in
the settlement of the Mathiessen-Hegler Zinc Company case.
830 Sim-
ilar provisions were embodied in the agreements which settled the dis-
putes at American Car and Foundry Company,3 3 1 Houston Pipe Line
Company,332 Henry Disston and Sons,333 and National Fireproofing
Corporation.
34
The Pyrites Company33 5 agreement granted almost the equivalent
of a union shop. In addition to the requirement that members remain
in the union, all new employees were required to join. Members were
allowed to resign, however, by continuing to pay dues for twelve
months.
33 6
The agreement in the Colorado Fuel and Iron case337 provided for
determination of the union security issue by the Board in accordance
with the decision in the "Little Steel" cases. As indicated above, the
result was a standard maintenance of membership clause. 
8
.2 Connor Lumber and Land Company and -International Woodworkers of
America (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 18 (Jan. 27, 1942). 9
LAB. RaL. REP. 694 (Feb. 23, 1942).
"" Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company and Transport Workers
Union (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 66 (March 5, .1942). 10
LAB. Rt. REP. 190 (April 6, 1942).
... Westinghouse Air Brake Company and United Electrical Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 97 (April 3, 1942). 10 LAB. R.. REP.
565-566 (June 29, 1942).
'28Singer Manufacturing Company and United Electrical Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 201 (June 8, 1942). 10 LAn. REX.. REP.
634 (July 13, 1942).
32J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company and United Steelworkers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 328 (Aug. 4, 1942). 10 LAB. RXr. REP.
886 (Aug. 31, 1942).
"I Mathiessen-Hegler Zinc Company and Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 165 (May 19, 1942).
.American Car and Foundry Company and Marine and Shipbuilding Work-
ers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 233 (June 25, 1942).
.2 Houston Pipe Line Company and Oil Workers International Union (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 191 (June 2, 1942).
... Henry Disston and Sons and Federal Labor Union (AFL), National War
Labor Board case No. 269 (July 10, 1942).
"I' National Fireproofing Corporation and United Brick and Clay Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 255 (July 7, 1942).
" Pyrites Company and Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (CIO), National
War Labor Board case No. 286 (July 16, 1942).
" 10 LAB. RET. REP. 822 (Aug. 17, 1942).
" Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation and International Union of Mine, Mill,
and Smelter Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 51 (Feb.
19, 1942).
.. 10 LAB. REL.. REP. 140 (March 23, 1942).
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Two cases in which the parties agreed to arbitrate the union security
issue resulted in the awarding of maintenance of membership. In the
..Universal Products case83 9 the clause applied to any employee who had
been a member of the union at any time between July 25, 1941, and
May 27, 1942. Loss of membership did not mean discharge if the
employee agreed to a check-off of union dues.340 In the Monroe Cal-
culating Machine case3 41 the arbitration award handed down by the
mediation panel granted a standard maintenance clause.
8 42
2. Check-Off. Whereas the check-off was included in no recom-
mendations and in only two agreements in the Mediation Board cases,
under the War Labor Board provisions were made for some form of
check-off in fourteen orders, in thirteen voluntary agreements, and in
one arbitration award. Sometimes the check-off was given to supple-
ment other union security provisions such as maintenance of member-
ship, and in other cases it was given as a substitute for demands that
were refused. Usually the application of the check-off was made de-
pendent upon written authorization by the individual employee. Some-
times the employee was given the privilege of canceling this authoriza-
tion at any time, while in other cases it was non-revocable for the
duration of the contract.
In the Marshall Field case 343 the Board order merely embodied the
terms of an agreement already made between the parties, including,
among other things, a voluntary, non-revocable check-off.344 In the
Bower Roller Bearing case3 45 the Board said that the employer's ob-
jection to the check-off was unreasonable because he had previously
given it to a company union.3 46  Similarly, in the Remington Rand
case 347 a check-off had previously been made by the company for a
social club.348 In the Arcade Malleable Iron case3 49 the company had,
during the course of hearings before the panel, indicated its willingness
to concede to a voluntary revocable check-off. Consequently, when the
"' Universal Products Company and United Automobile Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 110 (April 11, 1942).
"10 10 LAB. Ru. REP. 445-446 (June 1, 1942).
... Monroe Calculating Machine Company and United Electrical Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 127 (April 28, 1942).
4,2 10 LAB. REL. RE'. 634-635 (July 13, 1942).
398 Marshall Field (Spray, N. C.) and Textile Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 10 (Jan. 15, 1942).
", National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, March 5, 1942.
"'Bower Roller Bearing Company and United Automobile Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 12 (Jan. 22, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, March 12, 1942.
" 7 Remington Rand Company and United Electrical Workers (CIO), National
War Labor Board case No. 44 (Feb. 13, 1942).
"110 LAB. R.L. REP. 312 (April 27, 1942).
3,9 Arcade and Malleable Iron Works and Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. N. D. M. B. 84 (Jan. 14,
1942).
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Board refused to grant maintenance of membership it ordered the
check-off instead.350
At the White Sewing Machine Corporation351 the practice had been
for the shop stewards to collect dues on company time and on company
property. The company had not objected to this practice, although it
had deducted from the stewards' pay for the time lost, and these
amounts had been made good to the stewards by the union. The Board,
granted a check-off because this past practice had cost the union approxi-
mately $2500 a year and had interfered considerably with production.
52
In the Armour Leather Company case 53 the Board denied main-
tenance of membership, but granted a voluntary, revocable check-off on
the grounds that it was used in other contracts in that area0
54
The usual procedure in establishing a check-off was for the -union to
supply the company with a list of its members. At the American Brass
Company3 55 the union preferred not to do this because some of its
members feared to let it be known that they belonged to the union, lest
they be discriminated against by lesser executives. For this reason the
contract provided that the company would furnish check-off authoriza-
tion cards to all employees, and those union members who wished to
conceal their membership could continue to pay their dues directly to
the union.350
In the "Little Steel" cases357 the collection of dues took a consider-
able amount of the union officials' time because the plants and the
workers' homes were widely scattered and the workers were of many
races. The Board said that a check-off would give the union officials a
chance to devote their time to maintaining discipline and increasing
production. The employer members of the Board objected to the fact
that the check-off was applied to all union members without giving
them an opportunity for individual choice. They contended that: "If
11* 10 LAB. REt,. REI'. 379 (May 11, 1942).
"'White Sewing Machine Corporation and United Electrical Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 65 (March 5, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, May 1, 1942.
"'Armour Leather Company and International Union of Fur and Leather
Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 98 (April 3, 1942).
00410 LAB. REL. REP. 506-508 (June 15, 1942).
0American Brass Company and Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 131 (April 29, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 25, 1942.
1 Inland Steel Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 35 (Feb. 10, 1942) ; Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company and ,Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO), National War
Labor Board case No. 34 (Feb. 10, 1942) ; Republic Steel Corporation and Steel
Workers Organizing Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 31
(Feb. 7, 1942); Bethlehem Steel Corporation (14 plants) and Steel Workers
Organizing Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 30 (Feb. 6,
1942).
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the workers were convinced of the benefits to be derived from financial
support of the unions no compulsion would be necessary."3
In the Buckeye Cotton Oil case3 5 the check-off was granted to
protect a union from employer and community opposition.38 0 In the
Los Angeles Railway case&61 the Board said that an individually author-
ized, revocable check-off would aid peaceful labor relations. 0 2 In the
case involving Five Subsidiaries of United States Steel'"3 the Board
applied the same check-off and maintenance provisions as in the "Little
Steel" cases. The employer members objected, however, on the grounds
that this case involved no anti-union activities by the company, and
thus union security provisions were not needed. They contended that
if any check-off was granted it should be voluntary and revocable.
3 0 4
In seven cases the Board specifically refused to grant the union's
demand for a check-off. In six of these the Board did grant main-
tenance of membership, however, and in the seventh case the Board
indicated that it probably would have ordered a maintenance clause
except that special circumstances made it of no value to the union.
In three of these disputes, J. L Case Company,s06 Consolidated Steel
Corporation, 6 and Norma-Hoffinan Bearings Corporation3 0 7 the Board
indicated that a check-off request was refused because the granting of
maintenance of membership gave the union sufficient security. In the
Consolidated Steel case the public member of the panel gave as his rea-
sons for rejecting the check-off:
"... there is no sound reason why the company should be put to the
trouble and expense of collecting the Union's dues for it; indeed ...
in the long run it would be to the mutual advantage of the Union and
its members for the Union to be responsible for the collection of its
own dIues, for the Union would then strive to minimize this chore by
making membership so worthwhile that most members would pay their
dues without solicitation. . ... 368
= 8 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 16, 1942.
"' Buckeye Cotton Oil Company and United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing,
and Allied Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 59 (Feb. 27,
1942).:o National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 31, 1942.
"Los Angeles Railway Corporation and Amalgamated Street and Railway
Employees (AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 162 (May 18, 1942).
.. 10 LAB. R.L. REP. 753-754 (Aug. 3, 1942).
"' United States Steel Corporation (five subsidiaries: Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corporation, Columbia Steel Company, American Steel and Wire Company, Na-
tional Tube Company, Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company) and United
Steelworkers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 364 (Aug. 12, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 26, 1942.
.. J. I. Case Company and United Automobile Workers (CIO), National War
Labor Board case No. 130 (April 28, 1942).
' "Consolidated Steel Corporation and Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 43 (Feb. 13, 1942).
"'7Norma--offman Bearings Corporation and United Electrical Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 120 (April 24, 1942).
"' National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 6, 1942.
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At the Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation69 there already
existed an arrangement whereby employees could ask the company to
assign a part of their wages. Consequently, the Board felt that no pro-
vision. for any other kind of check-off was necessary.370
A strong dissenting opinion was written by the two CIO memberg
when the Board refused to grant a check-off in the Amrican Aluminum
Co"Zpany3 7 1 and the American Magnesium Company casesY7,2  The
dissent said in part:
"The problem of collecting dues in large plants employing many
thousands of workers . . . requires expenditure! of time and energy
which could otherwise be devoted to problems of production....
In its decision in the "Little Steel". cases regarding the check<-off
the Board declared: 'The voluntary accepted binding check-off will
contribute to the stability and security of the Union, ... The check-off
eliminates picket lines for collecting dues and their'attendant abuses.
With a maintenance-of-membership clause, the check-off prevents the
necessity for the discharge of a would-be delinquent . .. the check-off
will save the time of union leaders for the settlement of grievances and
the improvement of production.'
The circumstances in these cases are not perhaps entirely parallel
to those in the "Little Steel" cases. However, ifi the latter cases the
Board ordered a check-off without individual authorizations. The cir-
cumstances are sufficiently similar, nevertheless, to warrant the granting,
at least, of a voluntary check-off in these cases.' 'a3a
At the Cambridge Tile Manufacturing Company3 74 there already
existed a voluntary check-off covering all employees in the plant. The
union asked for a compulsory check-off for all employees. The panel
ruled that compulsory, check-off was not necessary because the volun-
tarypractice was agreed by both parties to have worked satisfactorily.
The union admitted that a maintenance of membership clause would
be of no benefit to it.
a 75
Agreements embodying some type of check-oft were reached in
thirteen cases. These were the cases at: Bendix Aviation Corpora-
.. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation and Metal Trades Department
(AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 99 (April 3, 1942).
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 4, 1942.
17'Aluminum Company of America and Aluminum Workers of America
(CIO), United Automobile Workers (CIO), National Assembly of Die Casting
Workers (CIO), National War Lab'or Board case No. 64 (March 2, 1942).
172American Magnesium Company and District 50 United Mine Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 33 (Feb. 10, 1942).
" National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 20, 1942.
... Cambridge Tile Manufacturing Company and Glass, Ceramic, and Silica
Sand Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 113 (April 14, 1942).
"" National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 12, 1942.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion1,3 Marshall Field,37 7 Connor Lumber and Land Company,3 78
Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation,79 Columbus and Southern Ohio
Electric Company,3 80 J. Sklar Manufacturing Company,38 ' Murray
Ohio Manufacturing Company, 82 .International Nickel Company,88"
Mathiessen-Hegler Zinc Company,384 Matthews Manufacturing Com-
pany,38 5  Walworth Manifacturing Company,380  West Penn Power
Company,3 8 7 and Ohio Power Campany and Beech Bottom Power
Company.88
The arbitration award handed down by the mediation panel in the
Monroe Calculating Machine Company case"89 provided an author-
ized, irrevocable check-off.
3 0
3. Preferential Hiring. Preferential hiring of union men was
granted in three Board orders, in the cases involving the United States
Lines Company,3 91 Hotel Employers' Association of San Francisco,
8 0 2
and Realty Advisory Board of New York City.8 3 In all three of these
... Bendix Products Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation and United
Automobile Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 2 (Jan. 14,
1942).
(C Marshall Field (Spray, N. C.) and Textile Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 10 (Jan. 15, 1942).
38 Connor Lumber and Land Company and International Woodworkers of
America (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 18 (Jan. 27, 1942).
", Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation and International Union of Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 51 (Feb.
19, 1942).
880 Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company and Transport Workers
Union (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 66 (March 5, 1942).
"'1J. Sklar Manufacturing Company and Electrical Workers (CIO), National
War Labor Board case No. 57 (Feb. 25, 1942).
"' Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company and United Automobile Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 37 (Feb. 11, 1942).
883 International Nickel Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 154 (May 14, 1942).
.8. Mathiessen-Hegler Zinc Company and Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 165 (May 19, 1942).
38I Matthews Manufacturing Company and Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 84 (March 23, 1942).
.8 Walworth Manufacturing Company and Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 167 (May 19, 1942).
387 West Penn Power Company and Utility Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 242 (June 29, 1942).
388 Ohio Power Company and Beech Bottom Power Company and Utility
Workers Organizing Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 241
(June 29, 1942).
'8" Monroe Calculating Machine Company, Incorporated, and United Electrical
Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 127 (April 28, 1942).
80 10 LAB. Rz.. REP. 634-635 (July 13, 1942).
89 United States Lines Company and Association of Masters, Mates, and
Pilots (AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 82 (March 16, 1942).
882 Hotel Employers' Association (San Francisco, Cal.) and Hotel and Res-
taurant Employees (AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 21 (Jan. 30,
1942).
'3 Realty..Advisory Board (New York City) and Building Service Employees
(AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 141 (May 1, 1942).
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cases there had already existed some form of preferential shop either
in the industry as a whole or with the particular employer.
In the United States Lines case both the union anti the company
submitted drafts of the forms which they thought the preferential hiring
clause should take. The panel composed a compromise which pro-
vided that:
"(a) The Company may make its own selection of men to fill vacan-
cies for licensed deck officers, even though those selected are not union
members, as long as they become members of the Union upon their
employment. This particular procedure may apply either as respects
the hiring of deck officers 'from the outside' or as respects the pro-
motion of seamen in the employ of the Company. (b) The Company
may employ licensed deck officers under the preference requirements of
the clause. This requires the giving of preference to qualified union
members. If such qualified officers cannot b6 provided by the Union
from its members, however, the Company may then employ deck offi-
cers who are not members of the Union and who are not obligated to
become members of the Union."
' 94
The Hotel Employers Association of San Francisco had previously
operated under a contract which provided for preferential hiring. The
unions, however, contended that the preferential hiring clause had been
evaded, and requested a union shop. The Board modified the prefer-
ential hiring clause so as to correct the past abuses and strengthened it
with maintenance of membership3 95
In the Realty Advisory Board case the Board modified the existent
preferential hiring clause to bring it into line with the maintenance of
membership contract which it had ordered. The order left unchanged
that part of the old agreement which provided:
"When a Union man in good standing is discharged or leaves for
any cause whatever, he must be replaced by a man who is already a
member of the Union and who is in good standing. If the Union can
supply no man adequate for the job, or if the Union specifically waives
its right to supply an employee, then the employer may hire any one
he chooses."3a9 6
In order to fit the old clause with the voluntary maintenance of
membership provision, the Board ordered discontinuance of the part
which required all such replacements to join the union within five
days. 
3 7
The parties reached an agreement in the Robert Jacobs Shipyards
case3 98 providing for maintenance of membership plus a requirement
... National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, May 27, 1942.
'National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 4, 1942.
=' 10 LAD. REL. REP. 792-793 (Aug. 10, 1942).
SD? National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, Aug. 3, 1942.
.. Robert Jacobs Shipyards and International Brotherhood of Carpenters
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that new employees be chosen from union members if available. The
company was permitted to rehire former employees who had been on
the payroll during the previous year without requiring them to join.P0D
4. All-Union Shop. The War Labor Board never issued a directive
order granting any kind of closed shop or union shop, in spite of the
fact that they were demanded by unions in a great number of cases. It
is probably true that although these unions would have been pleased to
obtain an all-union shop, in most cases they had very little hope of
obtaining it through a Board order. No union presented the Board
with a determined demand for an all-union shop, as had been the case
in the captive mines dispute, under the Mediation Board. Instead they
seemed to have resigned themselves to the fact that the government was
not going to order an all-union shop, and busied themselves with trying
to obtain as much as possible in the way of other union security
clauses. Although union leaders had insisted that the War Labor
Board not adopt a policy that it would never grant an all-union shop,
the labor members of the Board also seemed to have lost hope that the
Board would ever vote such a clause, and likewise concerned them-
selves with devising other methods by which union security could be
guaranteed.
Only one voluntary agreement provided for an all-union shop. With
the aid of a mediator the parties to the dispute in the Murray Ohio
Manufacturing Company case 400 agreed to a contract which left the
company free to hire whom it pleased, but required that all employees
become members of the union within thirty days and remain in good
standing.
401
Just as under the Mediation Board, many minor union security
devices were used in War Labor Board cases either as substitutes for
stronger clauses or as supplements to them. These devices included
various kinds of employer aids to the union, discipline of anti-union
activity, improved grievance procedures, promises to cooperate, or, in
the mildest form, promises by the employer to live up to the Wagner
Act by granting to the majority union exclusive bargaining rights, and
not discriminating against union members.
5. Encouragement of the Union. In four cases Board orders pro-
vided that the employer would encourage union membership. In the
Coos Bay Logging, Coos Bay Lumber, and Port Orford Cedar cases
402
(AFL), and Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers (CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. 4 (Jan. 14, 1942).
"19 LAD. RE. REP. 637 (Feb. 9, 1942).
"'0Murray Ohio 'Manufacturing Company and United Automobile Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 37 (Feb. 11, 1942).
10110 LAn. REL. REP. 290 (April 27, 1942).""Coos Bay Logging Company and International Woodworkers (CIO), Na-
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the order provided for maintenance of membership, and also required
the employer to advise new employees to join the union.40 3  In the
Babcock and Wilcox Company case 40 4 the Board order required the
company to present each new employee with a copy of the contract
and to recommend that all present and future members continue their
good standing in the union.
40 5
Several agreements provided that the employer would encourage
employees to join and remain in the union, although the employees
were not required to do so. In the Wolverine Tube Company agree-
ment 00 the company agreed to post notices saying that it favored all
employees joining the union and retaining their membership for the
life of the contract.40 7 The Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company0 s agreed
that while the union security issue was being arbitrated, the company
would encourage the employees to join the union and retain member-
ship.400  'the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company410 promised to take
"appropriate action" to encourage 100 per cent membership and pay-
ment of dues. 41 ' In the Food Machinery Corporation case412 the agree-
ment provided that the company would encourage membership and
discourage any activities aimed at undermining the union.413  The
International Nickel Company414 stated that it recognized the value of
responsible leadership, and agreed to recommend that members stay in
the union.415 The Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company416
agreed to send an official letter to the union, in which it called the
tional War Labor Board case No. 157 (May 15, 1942); Coos Bay Lumber Com-
pany and International Woodworkers (CIO), National War Labor Board case
No. 156 (May 15, 1942); Port Orford Cedar Company and International Wood-
workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 155 (May 15, 1942).
' 10 LAB. REL. Ra. 799 (Aug. 10, 1942).
'"Babcock and Wilcox Company and United Electrical Workers (CIO),
National War Labor Board case No. 68 (March 5, 1942).
'" National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, April 22, 1942.
... Wolverine Tube Company and United Automobile Workers (CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. N. D. M. B. 100 (Jan. 14, 1942).
,07 9 LAB. REL REP. 638 (Feb. 9, 1942).
' Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company and International Association" of Ma-
chinists (AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 13 (Jan. 22, 1942)."' 9 LAB. REL. REP. 695 (Feb. 23, 1942).
. '1 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company and Federation of Glass, Ceramic, and
Silica Sand Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 49 (Feb. 19,
1942)."1 10 LAB. Ri.. REP. 501 (June 15, 1942).
' Food Machinery Corporation and International Brotherhood of Boiler-
makersi Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers (AFL), National War Labor Board
case No. 73 (March 14, 1942).
l1 , LAB. REL. REP. 234 (April 13, 1942).
414 International Nickel Company, Incorporated, and Steel Workers Organ-
izing Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 154 (May 14,
1942).
415 10 LAn. REL. REP. 534 (June 22, 1942).
418 Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company and Transport Workers
Union (CIO), National War Labor.Board case No. 66 (March 5, 1942).
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attention of the employees to the maintenance of membership contract
and stated that it did not object to employees signing authorizations
which obligated them to the maintenance and check-off provisions
417
In the case of the Ohio Power Company and Beech Bottom Power
Company418 the employers agreed to give a copy of the union contract
to all new employees for their observation.
419
6. Discipline of Anti-Union Activity. Five settlements provided
that the employer would prevent activities by rival unions or anti-union
employees which might endanger the status of the established union.
In the Armstrong Brothers Tool case4 20 the Board decided that the
company's past record entitled the union to a provision that any anti-
union activity would call for discipline.421 In the Robins Dry Dock
case422 the Board order recognized the duty of the company to dis-
cipline anyone who attempted to undermine the union.
423
The agreement in the Wolverine Tube case424 provided that the
company would prevent anti-union activities on company time.425 The
Domestic Coke Corporalion42G agreed to discipline any anti-union
activities in return for an agreement by the union to discipline any
members who coerced other employees.427 In the J. Sklar Manufac-
turing Company case 428 the agreement provided that in case of any
anti-union activity by a supervisory employee, an arbitrator would fix
the perialty, and if it was found that an executive was responsible the
arbitrator was to devise "an appropriate remedy, including (if, in his
discretion, this should be necessary) an appropriate union security
clause which shall be embodied in this agreement."
429
7. Non-Discrimination. Several contracts embodied what the
Wagner Act required by law-a promise by the employer not to dis-
criminate against employees for union membership or activities. The
10 LA. z L. REP. 190 (April 6, 1942).
' Ohio Power Company and Beech Bottom Power Company and Utility
Workers Organizing Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No.
241 (June 29, 1942).
"1' 10 LAD, RL. REP. 822-823 (Aug. 17, 1942).
".Armstrong Brothers Tool Company and United Automobile Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 32 (Feb. 7, 1942).
2' 10 LAn. REL REP. 384 (May 11, 1942).
"2 Robins Dry Dock and Industrial Unibn of Marine and Shipbuilding Work-
ers (CIO),.National War Labor Board case No. N. D. M. B. 97 (Jan. 14, 1942)."110 LADn. REL. REP. 481 (June 8, 1942).
.2 Wolverine Tube Company and United Automobile Workers -(CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. N. D. M. B. 100 (Jan. 14, 1942).
4229 LA. R.L. REP. 638 (Feb. 9, 1942).
' Domestic Coke Corporation and United Mine Workers (CIO), National
War Labor Board case No. 100 (April 4, 1942).
421 10 LAB. RF-L. REP. 445 (June 1, 1942).
'28J. Sklar Manufacturing Company and Electrical Workers (CIO), National
War Labor Board case No. 57 (Feb. 25, 1942).
,29 10 LAB. RE.. REP. 290-291 (April 27, 1942).
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provision ordered by the Board in the Arcade Malleable Iron case
430 is
typical:
"The Company agrees that there shall be no discrimination against
any Employees because of Union or Non-Union Membership. The
Union agrees not to coerce or intimidate Employees into membership
or engage in any Union activities on Company 
time or property.
' 431
Similar provisions were ordered by the Board in the Armstrong
Brothers Tool case,
432 the Bemis Brothers Bag Company case,
433 and
the Armour Leather Company case.
434 Promises of non-discrimination
and non-interference were contained in the agreements reached at Pull-
man Standard Car Mamacturing Company,
43 5 Goodyear Aircraft
Corporation/4 3
6 Roller Bearing Company,
43 7 and Barrett Chemical
Company.
438
8. Miscellaneous. The Board order in the case of the Hotel Em-
ployers' Association of San Francisco
439 improved the grievance pro-
cedure as a method of guaranteeing that the employers live up to the
preferential hiring clause.
440
In the case of the Union Electric Company of Illinois
441 a dispute
had arisen as to whether or not the existing contract prohibited the
transferring of non-union employees to plants where union shop agree-
ments were in effect. The Board ruled that in entering into the agree-
ment the parties stated that they did so for the purpose of "promoting
harmony and efficiency," and that this desired end was not obtained by
, 0 Arcade and Malleable Iron Works and Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. N. D. M. B. 84 (Jan. 14,
1942).
,'10 LAB. REL. REP. 380 (May 11, 1942).
"
2 Armstrong Brothers Tool Company and United Automobile Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 32 (Feb. 7, 1942).
Bemis Brothers Bag Company (5 plants) and Textile Workers Union
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 262 (July 8, 1942).
... Armour Leather Company (5 plants) and International Union of Fur and
Leather Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 98 (April 3,
1942).
"" Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Company and Steel Workers Organ-
izing Committee (CIO), International Association of Machinists (AFL), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. 39 (Feb. 12, 1942).
10 Goodyear Aircraft Corporation and International Association of Machinists
(AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 27 (Feb. 5, 1942).
'' Roller Bearing Company of America and United Automobile Workers
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 93 (March 31, 1942).
"' Barrett Chemical Company and United Construction Workers (CIO), Na-
tional War Labor Board case No. 327 (Aug. 3, 1942).
"I Hotel Employers' Association (San Francisco, Cal.) and Hotel and Res-
taurant Workers (AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 21 (Jan. 
30,
1942).
10 National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, June 4, 1942.
"I Union Electric Company and International Union of Operating Engineers
(AFL), National War Labor Board case No. 62 (Feb. 28, 1942).
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transferring non-union employees to such plants unless those employees
were willing to join the union.
442
While this study covers none of the cases of the War Labor Board
after August 31, 1942, the trend in the Board's decisions seems to
indicate that by this date it had developed a fairly uniform policy toward
the different forms of union security. Although it is dangerous to
predict, this writer is of the opinion that there will be no important
shift in the Board's attitude toward uniform security, which means
that the Board will never grant an all-union shop, but will continue to
use the maintenance of membership formula in a majority of its union
security cases.
CONCLUSIONS
EVALUATION OF THE ALL-UNION SHOP IN GENERAL
Any defense of the all-union shop must be based on the assumption
that collective bargaining through independent unions is a desirable
thing. It is not the purpose of the present work to give a lengthy
discussion on the merits of unionization. It is sufficient to say that this
point has already been decided by Congress in the National Labor
Relations Act which says:
"The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal of the employers to accept the procedure of collective bar-
gaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest.
* ' .It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce . .. by encouraging the practice and procedure of col-
lective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of represent-
atives of their own &hoosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
ternis and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection." 443
Granting that unions are desirable, and considering the dangers
which they always face from the opposition of employers and the com-
petition of non-union workers, one is forced to concede that under
present conditions the all-union shop is a necessary part of American
industrial relations.
Abuses of the All-Union Shop. The abuses which are often charged
to the all-union shop are not inherent in it nor necessarily connected
with it. Employers often argue that the all-union shop is the cause of
strikes, jurisdictional disputes, slow-downs, resistance to management,
inefficiency of workmanship, restrictive practices, racketeering, mis-
10 LAB. REL. REP. 483 (June 8, 1942).
"'49 STAT. 449, §1 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §151 (1942).
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management of union funds, collusive agreements between unions and
employers, and dictatorship by union officers. No one who reads the
daily newspapers would attempt to deny that these conditions frequently
exist in American labor unions. It would be a serious mistake, how-
ever, to conclude that such practices are typical, and it would be even
more erroneous to consider them a necessary concomitant of the all-
union shop.
These abuses can and do exist in open shops as well. It is true, that
a union which is protected by an all-union shop is in a sufficiently secure
position to get away with these high-handed tactics. It is probably also
true 'that union officials more easily become tyrants when they can
threaten members with expulsion from the union and discharge from
work. But with these possibilities considered, it must still be remem-
bered that the chance that an individual worker will suffer from oppres-
sion by a union official under an all-union shop contract. is much less
than the chance that he will suffer from oppression by an employer
in an open shop.
Needed Legislation. Furthermore, these union abuses are of a
nature that can and probably will be reduced by appropriate govern-
ment regulations. Since organized labor has received so much from the'
government in recent years, it is only fair that the beneficiary unions
agree to meet certain standards in their internal affairs. Labor unions
themselves will welcome such legislation if they are far-sighted enough
to see that the whole labor movement is being discredited by the irreg-
ular acts of a few irresponsible unions and dishonest leaders.
This type of regulation is envisaged in the proposed Vinson Bill
which was introduced in Congress on January' 22, 1942. This bill
would require business or trade associations and labor unions to rdg-
ister with the Department of Commerce and file each year certain
information, including: names, addresses, compensation and terms of
office of the principal officers of the union; information showing the
assets and liabilities of the union, together with its receipts and ex-
penditures during each year; a description of the union's collective bar-
gaining contracts; and a copy of the constitution and by4aws, together
with a description of the union's activities. This law would provide
for no regulation of unions, but would place such information under
the scrutiny of public opinion.
444
Perhaps it would be advisable to specifically prohibit by law the
closing of union membership books or the exaction of unreasonable
initiation fees. Other legislation which'seems to be necessary is the
amending of the Anti-Racketeering Act and the Anti-Trust Act, in
such a way as to bring certain notorious union practices within the
'"H. P, 6444, 88 CONG. REc. 585 (1942).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
scope of laws from which they have hitherto been considered exempt.
Such a legislative program as this would largely eliminate the union
abuses which otherwise might hide behind the protective cloak of an
all-union shop contract.
Evaluation of Pros and Cons. The merits of the all-union shop
can be judged by its effects on the employer, employee, the union, and
the public. The employer's job of maximizing production and min-
imizing costs may be either helped or hindered by an all-union shop,
depending chiefly upon the attitudes of the worker and the employer
himself. Where an employer shows by his actions that he has accepted
a union in good faith and the employees know that they have nothing
to fear from management, it is reasonable to assume that union mem-
bers and officials will show greater inclination to cooperate in making
production more efficient. Union leaders know that successful opera-
tion of the business affects the wages and working conditions of their
members just as it also affects the profits of the employer.
"It is easy to understand why an employer wants to be free of union
restrictions, but if, in being free, he insists on providing terms of
employment that do not permit his workers to live on a health-and-
decency plane, his private gain is decidedly outweighed by the loss to
society."
445
The effect of an all-union shop on the individual employee is of
primary importance. Where a union is striving to increase wages and
improve working conditions in a plant, surely it is not too much to ask of
the employees who benefit to accept their part of the responsibility and
the cost. If a non-union man is qualified to fill a job, but is prevented
from getting one because the union will not admit him to membership,
then undoubtedly he is deserving of fullest sympathy. But if the union
doors are open and the non-unionist deliberately refuses to join because
he dislikes the union or because he thinks he can get the same wages
and hours without paying dues, then he has made his choice and must
accept the consequences.
As Dr. Frank P. Graham said in the "Little Steel" case:
"Membership in any organization necessarily imposes restrictions.
A free union like our free society, derives its freedom from the consent
of the governed and from the subordination of personal rights to the
general welfare of all the members of the union. Limitations on indi-
vidual rights are, by the very nature of organized society, -the basis of
civilization itself. Some limitations on the individual liberties of work-
ers are self imposed for the larger liberty of the independence, dignity,
self expression, and creative cooperation of the workers in labor unions
"' DAUGHERTY, LAnoR PROBLEmS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (5th ed. 1941) 463.
Daugherty gives a concise but very sound evaluation of the effects of the all-union
shop.
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through which they have won and are winning a larger share in the
economic, social, and spiritual things by which men work and live, and
for which they hope and dream for themselves and their children. ' '446
There still remains the problem of the occasional all-union shop or
maintenance of membership contract which exists contrary to the wishes
of a majority of the employees, including even some of the union mem-
bers themselves. Under the National Labor Relations Act an all-union
shop contract, or any lesser form of union security contract such as
maintenance of membership, is completely legal, provided that the union
is the majority representative, and has not been aided by unfair labor
practices on the part of the employer 447  A union can become the
majority representative if a majority of the employees who vote in an
election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board vote for that
particular union. It often happens that many of the employees fail to
vote in such elections, and in this way the uniQn may become the
"majority" representative when less than a majority of the employees
favor having that union as their representative. This being the case,
the N.L.R.A. permits the signing of an all-union shop contract when a
mere majority, or even somewhat less than a majority of the employees
are in support of the union. In such a situation a large group of
employees are forced to join the union against their will. Aside from
the injustice of such a possibility, it is hard to see how the union would
profit by having within their membership a considerable bloc of em-
ployees who are in the union only because they were forced in, and
who are therefore eager to destroy it if ever the opportunity presents
itself.
This problem has been met by the Wisconsin Employment Peace
Act in its provision which outlaws the all-union shop except where
three fourths of the employees have voted for it in a secret ballot
referendum. 448  The same principle was applied in a different fashion
by the War Labor Board in the International Harvester cases 449 when
the 'directive order made the adoption of the maintenance of member-
ship dependent upon an affirmative vote by the majority of union
mmbers.
"" National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 16, 1942.
"" National Labor Relations Act, §8(3), 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
§158 (1940).
" STAT. OF Wis. (1941) c. 111, §111.01-111.19. The full text of the Wisconsin
Act is given in 4 LABOR RELATIONS REmawNcE MAxIAL (Washington: Bureau
of National Affairs, 1940) 962-972. For a discussion of the operation of the Act
see 10 LAD. REL. REP. 149 (March 30, 1942).
... International Harvester Company and Farm Equipment Workers Organ-
izing Committee (CIO), and United Automobile Workers (CIO), National War
Labor Board cases No. N. D. M. B. 4, N. D. M. B. 4-A, and N. D. M. B. 89 con-
solidated for consideration by the National War Labor Board (Jan., 14, 1942).
See mspra p. 173.
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In view of the wide extension of the all-union shop in recent years
and its probable further use in future years, this writer is of the opinion
that the Wagner Acts should be amended so as to embody the same
requirements as the Wisconsin law. or some modification thereof. The
signing of an all-union shop contract is a rather important step, and
some guarantee should be made that most of the employees, perhaps
three fourths, are in favor of it.
Little has been written of the effect that an all-union shop has on
the union, itself. It is difficult to make general statements because the
effect depends so much on the character of the officers and members,
and upon the particular situation in the plant. One big advantage of
the all-union shop is that it protects the union from slow disintegration;
a situation which sometimes results from the natural tendency of the
members to lose interest except in times of crisis. When the union is
in the midst of a fight over some important issue of working conditions,
the employees show great readiness to attend meetings and pay dues.
But once the battle is won they are apt to lose interest and cease con-
tributing to the organization which has benefited them. Thus the union
may find itself numerically and financially weakened when some later
period of crisis arises.
It has been stated above that the all-union shop probably does in-
crease the possibility of dictatorship by the officers, and legislative
remedies have been suggested. Some writers have suggested that
it would be better for unions and union leaders to be "vulnerable,"
for them to win their membership by proving their worth instead of
compelling membership with an all-union shop.450 "Proving their
worth" can operate in various ways, however. Leader's of new strug-
gling unions often win members by making extreme and unreasonable
demands on an employer. On the' other hand, union leaders who do
not have to worry about soliciting members and collecting dues have
more time to spend for settling grievances, increasing production, main-
taining discipline, and setting up numerous kinds of union benefits such
as accident, sickness, and unemployment insurance. Nor should it be
assumed that unions and union officers are automatically invulnerable
once they obtain an all-union shop. The records of the National Labor
Relations Board are full of cases where employees under an all-union
shop made a complete turnabout and signed a new all-union shop con-
tract with a different union as their bargaining agent.
Finally, how is the public affected by the all-union shop? There
have been instances, as in the construction industry, where unions,
either by themselves, or with the collusion of employers, have used the
"P John Chamberlain, Democracy and the Closed Shop (Jan., 1942) 25 FoR-
TUNE 64, 65.
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all-union shop in the furtherance of monopolistic tactics to exploit the
consumer. Mr. Thurman Arnold has been largely unsuccessful in his
attempts to prosecute such practices under the anti-trust laws, but it is
likely that the attendant publicity will lead to the improvement of these
laws so as to include labor unions within their scope.
Where unions restrict their membership it is clear that the public
good is sacrificed. But when the unions are kept open, the well-being of
society is improved by the service which unions perform to the Working
class through reducing their liability to accident and disease, raising their
standard of living, and extending the principles of democracy in Amer-
ican industrial relations.
,THE ALL-UNION SHOP IN WARTIME
So much for the all-union shop in general. But what of the all-
union shop in wartime, when American industry is straining to produce
the largest possible amount of war goods, when strikes must be elim-
inated, and industrial relations are in a state of constant change?
Should Union Status Have Been Frozen? Those who favor the
freezing of union status for the duration of the war point to the fact
that a moratorium was placed on the issue during World War I. Pre-
ceding the creation of the first National War Labor Board in 1918,
representatives of management and labor met and agreed that one of
the principles of the Board should be to refuse to make an arbitral
award which would change the existing status of the union. Under
this agreement existent all-union shops remained in force and unions
could negotiate with employers for an all-union shop, but no changes
in union security were ordered by the government.
451
Several important factors, however, differentiate the situation in
1918 from that which existed at the beginning of World War II. In
1918 labor agreed to freeze union status in return for a promise by
industry that it would not discriminate against union members and
would recognize the right of workers to organize for collective bar-
gaining, neither of which industry had been willing to do before. Labor
was glad to make this swap because the all-union shop was not an
important issue at that time, whereas their chief concern was obtaining
the right to organize.
When World War II broke out, however, the right to organize had
become a minor issue, being guaranteed by the Wagner Act, and a
great many unions were bending their main efforts toward consolidating
their position by securing an all-union shop. Unions remembered, more-
... TONER, TnE CLOSED SHOP (Washington: American Council on Public
Affairs, 1942) 80; National War Labor Board, (1921) Bureau of Labor Statistics.
United States Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 287.
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over, that following the first World War many of their gains had been
wiped out, and sought to insure themselves against another such occur-
rence. The first War Labor Board had adopted the freezing principle
because it had been agreed upon by both labor and management,
whereas no such agreement preceded the creation of the Defense
Mediation Board, and the Industry-Labor conference preceding the
1942 War Labor Board failed to agree on the union security issue.
It is not clear what the freezing of the status quo would mean,
anyway. In the midst of a war boom when hordes of new workers are
coming into plants, when many others are leaving to find new jobs in
other parts of the country, when non-defense plants are laying off many
or all of their employees, when other plants lay idle for months while
being converted to war production-in fluctuating conditions such as
these it is extremely difficult for a union to maintain its membership or
even to exist at all. The position of the union is even more precarious
if it has agreed not to strike, and thus cannot hold out to the workers
any big promises of improvement in working conditions. To deny such
a union the chance of strengthening its contract through some kind of
union security clause is clearly not maintaining the status quo. It is
this inflexibility of a general freezing order which argued for the settle-
ment of union security disputes by judging each case "on its merits."
Some observers have argued that freezing of the union security issue
or a statement of government policy on the issue would have eliminated
many disputes. Instead of each little union starting a dispute so that
its case could be judged "on its merits," such disputes would never have
arisen if the rules had been announced in advance, and other disputes
could have been quickly settled by reference to the rules.452
Any such statement of government policy on union security, how-
ever, would inevitably have left either management or labor completely
dissatisfied. The Industry-Labor Conference illustrated how far apart
the two groups were on this fundamental issue. Both groups feared
that the other was trying to take advantage of the emergency to
strengthen its position. This being the case, an enunciation of policy
by the government would have served no useful purpose. The only
alternative was to bring the disputes before some government agency
and let it decide on the basis of the facts in the individual cases whether
or not union security was needed, and if so, what form of security.4
53
The Work of the Defense Mediation Board and the War Labor
Board. Thus, it was left up to the Defense Mediation Board, and to
its successor, the War Labor Board, to hear union security disputes
and attempt to solve them in a way that would compromise the feelings
""Charles E. Wyzanski, Labor Disputes During the War (Jan. 19, 1942) 9
LAB. RE. REP. 543. , "'Ibid.
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of not only the disputing parties themselves, but also the three different
groups of the Board itself. Since the employer and labor, members of
the Board were rather firmly convinced of their respective positions the
main part of the task of finding a solution fell upon the public members.
(a) Maintenance of Membership. The public members felt that in
view of the no-strike agreement labor was entitled to some kind of
help in protecting itself against the disintegrating forces of the war,
yet they did not feel themselves justified in granting an all-union shop
except in very exceptional circumstances. In some of the earliest cases,
as they attempted to judge disputes on their merits, they hit upon the
maintenance of membership clause as a compromise which guaranteed
the unions against loss of membership, yet did not present the objec-
tions of the all-union shop. During the summer of 1941, as case fol-
lowed case, the Mediation Board showed a tendency less to emphasize
special facts and more to favor the maintenance of membership clause
as a compromise solution in many disputes. 454 This tendency contin-
ued throughout the remainder of the Mediation Boards' activities and
was followed by the War Labor Board. By the summer of 1942, the
War Labor Board seems to have adopted an unofficial and unannounced
policy of granting maintenance of membership whenever union security
was demanded, unless it was very obviously unwarranted or would do
the union positive harm.
After examining the records of the Mediation Board and the War
Labor Board, this writer is of the opinion that maintenance of member-
ship, in most of the cases where it was granted, was probably the most
satisfactory compromise that could have been made under the circum--
stances. To many unions the acceptance of maintenance of membership
represented a considerable sacrifice on their part because by striking
they could probably have secured an all-union shop, higher wages, or
any of a number of other concessions. On the other hand, in many
cases maintenance of membership represented much more than the
weaker unions would have been able to obtain through their own efforts.
The policy of the War Labor Board was well expressed by Dean
Wayne L. Morse, public member, in an address on September 17, 1942:
"All our study and deliberation convinced us that a strong, respon-
sible and properly operated union would aid production. When the
fear of anti-union activity is removed, there is then a proper basis for
harmony and intelligent cooperation between union and management.
An attitude of mutual respect between labor and industry is the founda-
tion for a real participation in production by the worker....
In seeking a solution to this problem the Board was presented with
two extremes: the open shop on one side, the closed shop on the other.
The formula of maintenance of membership worked out by the Board
lul Id. at 545.
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is an admitted compromise and in the Board's opinion represents a
reasonable sacrifice by both parties with a maximum of benefit accruing
to the general public.
The Board sought a solution that would protect the union and its
members from the weakening effect of the no-strike agreement and
without penalizing the employer. To grant a dosed shop would be to
-lecree a national policy in favor of the closed shop in direct contraven-
tion of the President's statement of November 14, 1941, that 'the gov-
ernment of the United States will not order nor will Congress pass
legislation ordering a so-called closed shop.' To order an open shop
would result in continued friction between union and management,
great expenditure of time and energy by the union in membership cam-
paigning, picket lines, abortive and wild cat strikes, general industrial
unrest, and would have a seriously detrimental effect upon production.
Finally, after much travail and care, the Board adopted the so-called
maintenance of membership formula which in its present form provides
briefly that anyone who is a member of the union fifteen days from the
directive order must continue his membership for the life of the contract
as must also anyone joining thereafter. All workers are free to with-
draw from the union maintenance provision during the fifteen-day period
or refrain from joining without risk of losing their jobs. Both parties
are ordered to refrain from any type of coercion. Disputes arising as
to whether or not an individual is a union member are settled through
the use of ordinary grievance machinery or final arbitration by tlhe
Board.
This formula, the Board feels, provides an orderly, and peaceful
method of settling the question of union security. It means that the
union can rest secure in its membership without fear of anti-union
activity on the part of the employer and that it can devote its entire
efforts toward helping win the war. It means that the employer need
have no fear of strikes or picket lines seeking a union or closed shop;
that upon this issue the militant aspect of unionism is removed." 45 5
(b) Faults in the Work of the Two Boards. However, the work
of the Boards was by no means flawless, nor was maintenance of mem-
bership justified in all the cases where it was granted. A study of the
War Labor Board's decisions shows what appear to be inconsistencies.
For example, it is not always clear oh what basis the Board differen-
tiated between those cases where it granted maintenance of membership
or the check-off and those cases in which it refused these same demands.
Furthermore, in adopting an unofficial policy of almost always granting
maintenance of membership the Board was taking upon itself something
more than the mere settlement of disputes, and was not doing exactly
what it has always claimed it was -doing-deciding each case on its
merits. There is some truth to the contention of employer member
Roger D. Lapham that:
""Address by Dean Wayne L. Morse before the Federal Bar Association,
Washington, D. C., Sept. 17, 1942, National War Labor Board Unpublished
Release.
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"... the concern of the public members of the Board has been for
the formula by which maintenance of membership is to be required




These inadequacies in the War Labor Board work are largely ex-
plained by the manner in which the Board is organized. It is under-
standable that all of the Board's decisions have not been completely
consistent when one remembers that different panels heard different
cases and that the membership of the Board itself was constantly chang-
ing from case to case.
The tripartite composition of the Board explains much. It had not
only to conciliate the disputing parties, but to do so without disaffecting
the members of the Board. In reaching their decisions the Board
members were less like supreme court judges',than like horse traders.
The emotional state of the three groups of the Board often affected
the degree of their willingness to swap concessions with one another,
and consequently determined the form of the directive order.
45
7
One further point helps to explain the tendency of the Board to use
maintenance of membership whenever possible. As Dean Morse said
in the Caterpillar Tractor case, "the public members gave weight to the
fact that it would be highly desirable if the Board could reach a unani-
mous point of view on this union security issue."458  Thus, when the
public members by devising the standard form of maintenance clause.
were able to gain the approval of all but two of the members of the
Board, it is only natural that they would stick to that formula rather
than lose the support of the other employer members. In future cases,
when maintenance of membership has become more generally approved
by employers and the public, perhaps it will be possible for the Board
members to agree on further improvements on the present maintenance
of membership formula.
UNION SECURITY AFTER THE WAR
Without going so far as to make predictions, one can, on the basis
of recent trends, -make a few guesses as to what will be the status of
""The "Little Steel" cases: Inland Steel Company and Steel Workers Organ-
izing Committee (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 35 (Feb. 10, 1942) ;
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 34 (Feb. 10, 1942); Republic Steel
Corporation and Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO), National War
Labor Board case No. 31 (Feb. 7, 1942); Bethlehem Steel Corporation (14
plants) and' Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO), National War Labor
Board case No. 30 (Feb. 6, 1942). See supra pp. 180-182.
" 7 Interview with M. T. Van Hecke, formerly public member of a National
War Labor Board panel, now Southern Regional Director of the National War
Labor Bbard.
"' National War Labor Board Unpublished Release, July 5, 1942.
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union security after the war is over. One point which appears fairly
certain is that American unions will be enormously strengthened as a
result of the war boom and the aid given them by the Defense Mediation
Board and the War Labor Board. Those unions which have secured
maintenance contracts have been guaranteed against any loss of mem-
bership arid are fairly sure to gain, since any worker whom the union
organizers ever persuade to join the union must thereafter maintain
his membership for the duration of the contract. The post-war prob-
lem of organized labor will be chiefly one of maintaining its strength-
ened position against loss of membership, attacks from employers, or
possible reaction from the public in the form of anti-union legislation.
What will happen to all of these maintenance of membership con-
tracts when they expire after the war? Probably several different
things. Some employers who have been forced by one of the Boards to
grant maintenance of membership will be waiting for the first oppor-
tunity to rid themselves of it. Other employers who opposed it at first
may find after a period of wartime operation under maintenance of
membership that it has improved industrial relations and has made the
union responsible and cooperative.
What of the employees who have been persuaded to join the union
and place themselves under the maintenance provisions? If they have
suffered from the whip of union -dictators or have lost interest in the
union, they undoubtedly will welcome the day when they can resign
and cease paying dues. Thus, the post-war strength of organized labor
will depend greatly upon how the unions take advantage of the present
opportunity to prove their worth to employers and employees.
Before.the coming of the Defense Mediation Board and the War
Labor Board, the maintenance of membership contract was not very
common. Now that it is in such widespread Use and has been given
the approval of the government, it undoubtedly will continue to be
prevalent after the war. Unions which are not in a strong enough
position to demand an all-union shop will seek to obtain maintenance
of membership as an 'intermediary step. On the other hand, it will
probably be offered by employers as an alternative proposal to forestall
demands for the all-union shop. Unions which normally would have
obtained the all-union shop but which have been forced by the govern-
ment to take maintenance of membership during the war will be ready
and anxious. to secure a stronger form of contract.
From all appearances it seems now that the trend of union security
will continue to be the same for the remainder of the war, and that no
restrictive labor legislation will be passed for the duration. The War
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Labor Board will probably continue its policy 459* toward maintenance of
membership unless some tremendous scandal should occur involving a
maintenance contract granted by the Board. The present course of
public opinion seems to indicate that unions will be made subject to
some kind of regulatory legislation after the war. How strict such
laws will be depends upon how organized labor conducts itself for the
remainder of the emergency. Whatever happens, it seems almost cer-
tain that union security will be the fight of the future in American
industrial relations.
...* Since going to press a decision has been handed down which indicates that
the Board may now openly recognize that it has adopted a policy of granting main-
tenance-of-membership wherever there are no positive reasons against it.
"The Board awards its standard membership-maintenance clause, adopting the
report of the mediation officer, which declares:
'Since the present War Labor Board policy appears to be to grant union
security unless some definite reason can be shown for denying the union request,
it is recommended that the Board order the standard maintenance-of-membership
clause, with the 15-day withdrawal period. No evidence of irresponsibility was
presented to form any basis for an adverse recommendation in this point. Indeed
the company specifically states that relations with the union have been satisfactory
and harmonious'" Atlas Powder Company and International Union of Mine,
Mill, and Smelter Workers (CIO), National War Labor Board case No. 521
(Dec. 28, 1942), 11 LAD. RFu. REP. 60, 61 (Jan. 4, 1943).
